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Abstract
Private information retrieval (PIR) allows a user to retrieve a desired message from a set
of databases without revealing the identity of the desired message. The replicated databases
scenario was considered by Sun and Jafar in [1], where N databases can store the same K
messages completely. A PIR scheme was developed to achieve the optimal download cost given
by
(
1 + 1N +
1
N2 + · · ·+ 1NK−1
)
. In this work, we consider the problem of PIR from storage
constrained databases. Each database has a storage capacity of µKL bits, where L is the size of
each message in bits, and µ ∈ [1/N, 1] is the normalized storage. On one extreme, µ = 1 is the
replicated databases case considered in [1]. On the other hand, when µ = 1/N , then in order
to retrieve a message privately, the user has to download all the messages from the databases
achieving a download cost of 1/K. We aim to characterize the optimal download cost versus
storage trade-off for any storage capacity in the range µ ∈ [1/N, 1].
In the storage constrained PIR problem, there are two key challenges: a) construction of com-
munication efficient schemes through storage content design at each database that allow down-
load efficient PIR; and b) characterizing the optimal download cost via information-theoretic
lower bounds. The novel aspect of this work is to characterize the optimum download cost of
PIR from uncoded storage constrained databases for any value of storage. In particular, for any
(N,K), we show that the optimal trade-off between storage, µ, and the download cost, D(µ), is
given by the lower convex hull of the N pairs
(
t
N ,
(
1 + 1t +
1
t2 + · · ·+ 1tK−1
))
for t = 1, 2, . . . , N .
To prove this result, we first present the storage constrained PIR scheme for any (N,K). We
next obtain a general lower bound on the download cost for PIR, which is valid for the following
storage scenarios: replicated or storage constrained, coded or uncoded, and fixed or optimized.
We then specialize this bound using the uncoded storage assumption to obtain the converse
This work was supported by the NSF grants CAREER-1651492 and CNS-1715947. This paper was presented in
parts at 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), and 2018 IEEE International Symposium
on Information Theory (ISIT).
ar
X
iv
:1
80
5.
04
10
4v
2 
 [c
s.I
T]
  2
3 O
ct 
20
18
proof, i.e., obtaining lower bounds on the download cost for PIR from uncoded storage con-
strained databases as a function of the available storage. Given the system constraints, we
express the lower bound as a linear program (LP). We then solve the LP to obtain the best
lower bounds on the download cost for different regimes of storage, which matches the proposed
storage constrained PIR scheme.
1 Introduction
With the paradigm-shifting developments towards distributed storage systems (DSS), assuring pri-
vacy while retrieving information from public databases has become a crucial need for users. This
problem, also referred to as private information retrieval (PIR) has direct practical applications
in cloud storage or social networking, with examples in many areas such as: protecting investors
seeking stock market records or bank loans, customers searching for online reservations or insur-
ance policies with potential fare increase due to frequent searching, or even activists seeking files
that might be considered anti-regime. The original formulation of the PIR problem involves N non-
colluding databases, each database identically replicates the storage of K messages. Upon receiving
queries from the legitimate user, the databases answer truthfully with the required information,
which means they are curious but honest. Successful PIR must satisfy two properties: first, each
of the N message queries sent from the user to the N databases must reveal nothing about the
identity of the message being requested; and second, the user must be able to correctly decode the
message of interest from the answers received from the N databases.
A trivial solution to PIR is to download all the messages from the databases. Indeed this
approach will make the databases indifferent towards the identity of the message being requested,
but it is highly impractical especially when the number of messages K is too large. The goal is to
design an efficient protocol, which is characterized by the total upload/download cost the user has
to pay in order to download a message privately. The PIR problem has been studied extensively
within the computer science community [2–6]. In the pioneering work by Chor et al. [2], the authors
considered one bit length messages. The privacy was based on cryptographic assumptions, which
require NP hard computations to break. The privacy cost is calculated based on the total amount
of communication between the user and the databases, i.e., the upload cost which is the size of the
N queries, and the download cost which is the size of the N answers.
The Shannon theoretic approach for this problem is to allow the size of the messages to be
arbitrary large, and therefore the upload cost is considered negligible with respect to the download
cost, which is the more practical scenario. Based on the Shannon theoretic formulation, the rate
of a PIR scheme is the ratio between the number of desired vs downloaded bits, and PIR capacity
is then defined as the maximum achievable rate. Under these assumptions, the first achievable
PIR rate was found by Shah et al. in [7] equal to 1− 1N for N replicated non-colluding databases
and any number of messages, which is a close approximation to the PIR capacity, characterized
later in [1], for large number of databases. In a recent interesting work by Sun and Jafar [1],
the exact capacity of PIR (or the inverse of download cost) for any (N,K) was characterized as
(1 + 1N +
1
N2
+ · · ·+ 1
NK−1 )
−1.
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Since the appearance of [1], significant recent progress has been made on a variety of variations
of the basic PIR problem. The case of T -colluding PIR (or TPIR in short) was investigated by
Sun and Jafar in [8], where any T databases out of N are able to collude by sharing their received
queries. Robust PIR, in which any subset of N databases out of M fail to respond was also
investigated in [8]. The exact capacity of robust TPIR for any (T,M,N,K) and M ≥ N ≥ T
was characterized as (1 + TN +
T 2
N2
+ · · · + TK−1
NK−1 )
−1. The problem of PIR with databases storing
coded messages, using (N,M) MDS codes, was considered by Tajeddine and El-Rouayheb in [9]
and the capacity was subsequently characterized by Banawan and Ulukus in [10] to take the value
(1 + MN +
M2
N2
+ · · · + MK−1
NK−1 )
−1. This setting was further investigated for the scenario where any
T out of N databases can collude, also referred to as MDS-TPIR [11, 12] although its capacity
remains open for general set of parameters.
As opposed to the original PIR setting where the user privacy is the only concern, the problem
of symmetric PIR (SPIR) was first studied by Sun and Jafar in [13]. In this setting, privacy is
enforced in both directions, i.e., user must be able to retrieve the message of interest privately,
while at the same time the databases must avoid any information leakage to the user about the
remaining messages. The capacity of SPIR was characterized as 1 − 1N regardless the number of
messages, K. Later, the exact capacity for SPIR problem and (M,N) MDS-coded messages, or
MDS-SPIR, was characterized by Wang and Skoglund in [14] as 1 − MN . The capacity of cache
aided PIR was recently characterized in [15], where the user has a local cache of limited storage
0 ≤ S ≤ K and contents known to the databases. It was shown that memory sharing between full
storage and no-cache-aided PIR schemes is information-theoretically optimal, i.e., the download
cost is given by (1− SK )(1 + 1N + 1N2 + · · ·+ 1NK−1 )−1. Later in [16,17], the capacity for cache aided
PIR was studied when the side information at the user is unknown to the databases for both coded
and uncoded storage scenarios. The capacity of PIR with private side information, or PIR-PSI,
was characterized in [18] to take the value (1 + 1N +
1
N2
+ · · ·+ 1
NK−M−1 )
−1, where M is the number
of messages known as side information to the user.
The case of multi-message PIR, or MPIR, was investigated in [19, 20], in which the user wants
to privately retrieve P ≥ 1 out of K messages in one communication round. The capacity of
multi-round PIR, where the queries in each round are allowed to depend on the answers received
in previous rounds, was considered by Sun and Jafar in [21]. Although no advantage in terms of
capacity of having multi-rounds as opposed to the single round case considered in [1], it was shown
that the multi-round queries can help in reducing the storage overhead at the databases. In a
recent work by Banawan and Ulukus [22], the capacity of PIR with Byzantine databases (or BPIR)
was characterized, i.e., a scenario in which any subset of databases are adversarial and they can
respond with incorrect answers. Recently, Tajeddine et al. studied in [23] the PIR problem in the
presence of colluding, non-responsive and Byzantine databases. The PIR through wiretap channel,
or PIR-WTC, was considered by Banawan and Ulukus in [24], where the user wants to retrieve
a single message in the presence of an external eavesdropper that is adversely tries to decode the
contents being sent. Adding the constraint of asymmetric traffic for the databases was recently
considered by Banawan and Ulukus in [25]. The results show strict loss in PIR capacity due to the
asymmetric traffic constraints compared with the symmetric case in [1].
3
Majority of above works, however, assume the presence of replicated databases, each storing all
the K messages. Indeed, exceptions to this statement include the works on the case when database
store MDS coded data, where the databases must satisfy the M -out-of-N recoverability constraint.
Furthermore, [21] also investigated the problem of limited storage PIR for the special case of K = 2
messages and N = 2 databases. The authors presented interesting lower and upper bounds on the
capacity for this special case, and show the optimality of the proposed scheme for the case of linear
schemes. More recently in [26], the authors proposed a non-linear scheme for the canonical case
K = 2 and N = 2, showing that the proposed non-linear scheme uses less storage than the optimal
linear scheme when the retrieval rate is kept optimal.
Summary of Contributions– In this work, we consider the problem of PIR from uncoded
storage constrained databases. Each database has a storage capacity of µKL bits, where K is the
number of messages, L is the size of each message in bits, and µ ∈ [1/N, 1] is the normalized storage.
On one extreme, µ = 1/N is the minimum storage at databases so that the user can retrieve any
required message. If the user is interested in retrieving a message, he has to download all the K
messages from databases to achieve privacy. On the other hand, µ = 1 is the replicated databases
case settled in [1], where the download cost is minimal. Thus, we aim to characterize this trade-off
for any value of µ between these two extremes. In this work, we present an achievable scheme for
the storage constrained PIR problem which works for all (N,K). The achieved PIR download cost
is given by the lower convex hull of the N storage-cost pairs
(
t
N , 1 +
t
N +
t2
N2
+ · · ·+ tK−1
NK−1 )
−1
)
,
where t ∈ [1 : N ]. The achievablility proof, which was presented in parts in [27], works as follows:
For the discrete storage values µ = tN where µ ∈ [1 : N ], the storage design at the databases is
inspired by storage design schemes in the caching literature [28], where the users prefetch popular
content into memories to reduce peak traffic rates when downloading from a single server. As
opposed to caching schemes, the storage placement for storage constrained PIR scheme occurs at
the databases which should span the whole set of files. Our storage design allows dividing the PIR
scheme into blocks where only a subset of databases of size t is involved. The storage points in
between the discrete storage values can be achieved by a memory sharing argument, which is given
by the lower convex hull of the achieved rate-storage pairs.
As a first step in understanding the fundamental limits, we proved in [29] the optimality of
our storage constrained scheme for the special case of K = 3 messages, N = 3 databases, and
any storage value at the databases, under uncoded and symmetric assumptions for the storage
placement. Our second main contribution of this paper is to show that the proposed scheme is
information-theoretically optimal for any (N,K, µ), under uncoded storage placement assumption.
The key technical challenge in proving the lower bounds is dealing with all possible components of
storage at the databases limited by the storage and the message size constraints, which significantly
go beyond the techniques introduced in [1]. To this end, we tailor the mutual information of
the key components used in [1] for the full storage setting to the case of limited storage. The
main differences, however, is that we retain the terms of information theoretic capacity which
was discarded in [1]. We factorize these terms to arrive to the first universal lower bound on the
download cost, which is valid for both coded and uncoded placement strategies. Next, we specialize
the obtained lower bound to uncoded placement strategies inspired by the methodology recently
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Q
[k]
1
<latexit sha1_base64="BgITNa1lYopVrlqd69I0 bN1k82Y=">AAAB73icbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEUG9FLx5bMLaSxrLZbtqlu5uwuxFK6K/w4kHFq3 /Hm//GbZuDtj4YeLw3w8y8KOVMG9f9dkorq2vrG+XNytb2zu5edf/gXieZItQnCU9UJ8Kaciapb5jhtJMqi kXEaTsa3Uz99hNVmiXyzoxTGgo8kCxmBBsrPbR63mMejMJJr1pz6+4MaJl4BalBgWav+tXtJyQTVBrCsdaB5 6YmzLEyjHA6qXQzTVNMRnhAA0slFlSH+ezgCTqxSh/FibIlDZqpvydyLLQei8h2CmyGetGbiv95QWbiyzBn Ms0MlWS+KM44Mgmafo/6TFFi+NgSTBSztyIyxAoTYzOq2BC8xZeXiX9Wv6p7rfNa47pIowxHcAyn4MEFNOAW muADAQHP8ApvjnJenHfnY95acoqZQ/gD5/MH5C2QAg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="BgITNa1lYopVrlqd69I0 bN1k82Y=">AAAB73icbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEUG9FLx5bMLaSxrLZbtqlu5uwuxFK6K/w4kHFq3 /Hm//GbZuDtj4YeLw3w8y8KOVMG9f9dkorq2vrG+XNytb2zu5edf/gXieZItQnCU9UJ8Kaciapb5jhtJMqi kXEaTsa3Uz99hNVmiXyzoxTGgo8kCxmBBsrPbR63mMejMJJr1pz6+4MaJl4BalBgWav+tXtJyQTVBrCsdaB5 6YmzLEyjHA6qXQzTVNMRnhAA0slFlSH+ezgCTqxSh/FibIlDZqpvydyLLQei8h2CmyGetGbiv95QWbiyzBn Ms0MlWS+KM44Mgmafo/6TFFi+NgSTBSztyIyxAoTYzOq2BC8xZeXiX9Wv6p7rfNa47pIowxHcAyn4MEFNOAW muADAQHP8ApvjnJenHfnY95acoqZQ/gD5/MH5C2QAg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="BgITNa1lYopVrlqd69I0 bN1k82Y=">AAAB73icbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEUG9FLx5bMLaSxrLZbtqlu5uwuxFK6K/w4kHFq3 /Hm//GbZuDtj4YeLw3w8y8KOVMG9f9dkorq2vrG+XNytb2zu5edf/gXieZItQnCU9UJ8Kaciapb5jhtJMqi kXEaTsa3Uz99hNVmiXyzoxTGgo8kCxmBBsrPbR63mMejMJJr1pz6+4MaJl4BalBgWav+tXtJyQTVBrCsdaB5 6YmzLEyjHA6qXQzTVNMRnhAA0slFlSH+ezgCTqxSh/FibIlDZqpvydyLLQei8h2CmyGetGbiv95QWbiyzBn Ms0MlWS+KM44Mgmafo/6TFFi+NgSTBSztyIyxAoTYzOq2BC8xZeXiX9Wv6p7rfNa47pIowxHcAyn4MEFNOAW muADAQHP8ApvjnJenHfnY95acoqZQ/gD5/MH5C2QAg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="BgITNa1lYopVrlqd69I0 bN1k82Y=">AAAB73icbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEUG9FLx5bMLaSxrLZbtqlu5uwuxFK6K/w4kHFq3 /Hm//GbZuDtj4YeLw3w8y8KOVMG9f9dkorq2vrG+XNytb2zu5edf/gXieZItQnCU9UJ8Kaciapb5jhtJMqi kXEaTsa3Uz99hNVmiXyzoxTGgo8kCxmBBsrPbR63mMejMJJr1pz6+4MaJl4BalBgWav+tXtJyQTVBrCsdaB5 6YmzLEyjHA6qXQzTVNMRnhAA0slFlSH+ezgCTqxSh/FibIlDZqpvydyLLQei8h2CmyGetGbiv95QWbiyzBn Ms0MlWS+KM44Mgmafo/6TFFi+NgSTBSztyIyxAoTYzOq2BC8xZeXiX9Wv6p7rfNa47pIowxHcAyn4MEFNOAW muADAQHP8ApvjnJenHfnY95acoqZQ/gD5/MH5C2QAg==</latexit>
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<latexit sha1_base64="p6MxxdLiXzKibNO1s5wRj5tFmoc=">AAAB73icbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4 KkkR1FvVi8cKxlbSWDbbTbt0dxN2N0IJ/RVePKh49e9489+4bXPQ1gcDj/dmmJkXpZxp47rfztLyyuraemmjvLm1vbNb2du/10mmCPVJwhPVjrCmnEnqG2Y4baeKYhFx2oqG1xO/9USVZom8M6OUhgL3JYsZwcZKD5fd+mM eDMNxt1J1a+4UaJF4BalCgWa38tXpJSQTVBrCsdaB56YmzLEyjHA6LncyTVNMhrhPA0slFlSH+fTgMTq2Sg/FibIlDZqqvydyLLQeich2CmwGet6biP95QWbi8zBnMs0MlWS2KM44MgmafI96TFFi+MgSTBSztyIywAoTYz Mq2xC8+ZcXiV+vXdS829Nq46pIowSHcAQn4MEZNOAGmuADAQHP8ApvjnJenHfnY9a65BQzB/AHzucPzQaP8w==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="p6MxxdLiXzKibNO1s5wRj5tFmoc=">AAAB73icbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4 KkkR1FvVi8cKxlbSWDbbTbt0dxN2N0IJ/RVePKh49e9489+4bXPQ1gcDj/dmmJkXpZxp47rfztLyyuraemmjvLm1vbNb2du/10mmCPVJwhPVjrCmnEnqG2Y4baeKYhFx2oqG1xO/9USVZom8M6OUhgL3JYsZwcZKD5fd+mM eDMNxt1J1a+4UaJF4BalCgWa38tXpJSQTVBrCsdaB56YmzLEyjHA6LncyTVNMhrhPA0slFlSH+fTgMTq2Sg/FibIlDZqqvydyLLQeich2CmwGet6biP95QWbi8zBnMs0MlWS2KM44MgmafI96TFFi+MgSTBSztyIywAoTYz Mq2xC8+ZcXiV+vXdS829Nq46pIowSHcAQn4MEZNOAGmuADAQHP8ApvjnJenHfnY9a65BQzB/AHzucPzQaP8w==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="p6MxxdLiXzKibNO1s5wRj5tFmoc=">AAAB73icbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4 KkkR1FvVi8cKxlbSWDbbTbt0dxN2N0IJ/RVePKh49e9489+4bXPQ1gcDj/dmmJkXpZxp47rfztLyyuraemmjvLm1vbNb2du/10mmCPVJwhPVjrCmnEnqG2Y4baeKYhFx2oqG1xO/9USVZom8M6OUhgL3JYsZwcZKD5fd+mM eDMNxt1J1a+4UaJF4BalCgWa38tXpJSQTVBrCsdaB56YmzLEyjHA6LncyTVNMhrhPA0slFlSH+fTgMTq2Sg/FibIlDZqqvydyLLQeich2CmwGet6biP95QWbi8zBnMs0MlWS2KM44MgmafI96TFFi+MgSTBSztyIywAoTYz Mq2xC8+ZcXiV+vXdS829Nq46pIowSHcAQn4MEZNOAGmuADAQHP8ApvjnJenHfnY9a65BQzB/AHzucPzQaP8w==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="p6MxxdLiXzKibNO1s5wRj5tFmoc=">AAAB73icbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4 KkkR1FvVi8cKxlbSWDbbTbt0dxN2N0IJ/RVePKh49e9489+4bXPQ1gcDj/dmmJkXpZxp47rfztLyyuraemmjvLm1vbNb2du/10mmCPVJwhPVjrCmnEnqG2Y4baeKYhFx2oqG1xO/9USVZom8M6OUhgL3JYsZwcZKD5fd+mM eDMNxt1J1a+4UaJF4BalCgWa38tXpJSQTVBrCsdaB56YmzLEyjHA6LncyTVNMhrhPA0slFlSH+fTgMTq2Sg/FibIlDZqqvydyLLQeich2CmwGet6biP95QWbi8zBnMs0MlWS2KM44MgmafI96TFFi+MgSTBSztyIywAoTYz Mq2xC8+ZcXiV+vXdS829Nq46pIowSHcAQn4MEZNOAGmuADAQHP8ApvjnJenHfnY9a65BQzB/AHzucPzQaP8w==</latexit>
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<latexit sha1_base64="eMjBmaPLQqqOSjg1AyUyn2dyV1o=">AAAB73icbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4 KkkR1FvRi8cWjK2ksWy2m3bp7ibsboQS+iu8eFDx6t/x5r9x2+agrQ8GHu/NMDMvSjnTxnW/nZXVtfWNzdJWeXtnd2+/cnB4r5NMEeqThCeqE2FNOZPUN8xw2kkVxSLitB2NbqZ++4kqzRJ5Z8YpDQUeSBYzgo2VHlq9+mM ejMJJr1J1a+4MaJl4BalCgWav8tXtJyQTVBrCsdaB56YmzLEyjHA6KXczTVNMRnhAA0slFlSH+ezgCTq1Sh/FibIlDZqpvydyLLQei8h2CmyGetGbiv95QWbiyzBnMs0MlWS+KM44Mgmafo/6TFFi+NgSTBSztyIyxAoTYz Mq2xC8xZeXiV+vXdW81nm1cV2kUYJjOIEz8OACGnALTfCBgIBneIU3RzkvzrvzMW9dcYqZI/gD5/MH5baQAw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="eMjBmaPLQqqOSjg1AyUyn2dyV1o=">AAAB73icbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4 KkkR1FvRi8cWjK2ksWy2m3bp7ibsboQS+iu8eFDx6t/x5r9x2+agrQ8GHu/NMDMvSjnTxnW/nZXVtfWNzdJWeXtnd2+/cnB4r5NMEeqThCeqE2FNOZPUN8xw2kkVxSLitB2NbqZ++4kqzRJ5Z8YpDQUeSBYzgo2VHlq9+mM ejMJJr1J1a+4MaJl4BalCgWav8tXtJyQTVBrCsdaB56YmzLEyjHA6KXczTVNMRnhAA0slFlSH+ezgCTq1Sh/FibIlDZqpvydyLLQei8h2CmyGetGbiv95QWbiyzBnMs0MlWS+KM44Mgmafo/6TFFi+NgSTBSztyIyxAoTYz Mq2xC8xZeXiV+vXdW81nm1cV2kUYJjOIEz8OACGnALTfCBgIBneIU3RzkvzrvzMW9dcYqZI/gD5/MH5baQAw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="eMjBmaPLQqqOSjg1AyUyn2dyV1o=">AAAB73icbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4 KkkR1FvRi8cWjK2ksWy2m3bp7ibsboQS+iu8eFDx6t/x5r9x2+agrQ8GHu/NMDMvSjnTxnW/nZXVtfWNzdJWeXtnd2+/cnB4r5NMEeqThCeqE2FNOZPUN8xw2kkVxSLitB2NbqZ++4kqzRJ5Z8YpDQUeSBYzgo2VHlq9+mM ejMJJr1J1a+4MaJl4BalCgWav8tXtJyQTVBrCsdaB56YmzLEyjHA6KXczTVNMRnhAA0slFlSH+ezgCTq1Sh/FibIlDZqpvydyLLQei8h2CmyGetGbiv95QWbiyzBnMs0MlWS+KM44Mgmafo/6TFFi+NgSTBSztyIyxAoTYz Mq2xC8xZeXiV+vXdW81nm1cV2kUYJjOIEz8OACGnALTfCBgIBneIU3RzkvzrvzMW9dcYqZI/gD5/MH5baQAw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="eMjBmaPLQqqOSjg1AyUyn2dyV1o=">AAAB73icbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4 KkkR1FvRi8cWjK2ksWy2m3bp7ibsboQS+iu8eFDx6t/x5r9x2+agrQ8GHu/NMDMvSjnTxnW/nZXVtfWNzdJWeXtnd2+/cnB4r5NMEeqThCeqE2FNOZPUN8xw2kkVxSLitB2NbqZ++4kqzRJ5Z8YpDQUeSBYzgo2VHlq9+mM ejMJJr1J1a+4MaJl4BalCgWav8tXtJyQTVBrCsdaB56YmzLEyjHA6KXczTVNMRnhAA0slFlSH+ezgCTq1Sh/FibIlDZqpvydyLLQei8h2CmyGetGbiv95QWbiyzBnMs0MlWS+KM44Mgmafo/6TFFi+NgSTBSztyIyxAoTYz Mq2xC8xZeXiV+vXdW81nm1cV2kUYJjOIEz8OACGnALTfCBgIBneIU3RzkvzrvzMW9dcYqZI/gD5/MH5baQAw==</latexit>
Figure 1: Storage Constrained Private Information Retrieval.
proposed in [30] for uncoded caching systems, and later applied in our previous work on coded data
shuffling [31,32], and uncoded caching systems with secure delivery [33]. Applying these ideas help
in obtaining a linear program (LP) subject to the storage and message size constraints, which can
be solved for different regimes of storage to provide a set of lower bounds on the download cost,
and show that these bounds exactly match the storage-constrained PIR scheme.
1.1 Notation
The notation [n1 : n2] for n1 < n2, and n1, n2 ∈ N represents the set of all integers between n1,
and n2, i.e., {n1, n1 + 1, . . . , n2}. The combination coefficient
(
n
k
)
= n!(n−k)!k! equals zero for k > n,
or k < 0. Elements of ordered sets are placed between round brackets (), while for regular sets
we use curly brackets {}. We use bold letters to represent ordered sets, and calligraphy letters
for regular sets. In order to describe subsets of ordered sets, we use the subscript to give the
indexes of the elements being chosen from the set, e.g., for the ordered set pi = (pi1 . . . , pin),
pi[1:4] = (pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4). We denote Random Variables (RVs) by capital letters, and ordered sets
of RVs by capital bold letters. The set in the subscript of a set of ordered RVs is used for short
notation of a subset of the set of RVs, e.g., for an ordered set of RVs Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn), we use ZW
to denote the all the random variables Zi where i ∈ W. We use Wk to denote a message of index
k, and wjk to represent the bit number j of the message Wk.
2 Storage Constrained PIR: Problem Statement
We consider the PIR problem with N non-colluding databases, labeled as DB1,DB2, . . . ,DBN , and
K independent messages, labeled as W1,W2, . . . ,WK , where each message is of size L bits, i.e.,
H(W1) = H(W2) = · · · = H(WK) = L. (1)
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We assume that each database has a storage capacity of µKL bits. If we denote Z1, Z2, . . . , ZN as
the contents stored across the databases, where Zn is the storage content of DBn, then we have the
following storage constraint for each database:
H(Z1) = H(Z2) = · · · = H(ZN ) = µKL. (2)
We assume that the storage strategy employed by the user is completely public, i.e., each database
knows which contents are stored at all the other databases. The normalized storage parameter
µ can take values in the range 1/N ≤ µ ≤ 1. The case when µ = 1 is the setting of replicated
databases, with each database storing all the K messages. The lower bound µ ≥ 1/N is in fact a
necessary condition for reliable decoding.
The storage-constrained PIR model is shown in Figure 1. To request a message, a user privately
selects a number k between 1 and K corresponding to the desired message Wk. Then the user
generates N queries Q
[k]
1 , Q
[k]
2 , . . . , Q
[k]
N , where Q
[k]
n is sent to the nth database (DBn), and the
queries are independent of the messages, i.e.,
I(W1, . . . ,WK ;Q
[k]
1 , . . . , Q
[k]
N ) = 0, ∀k ∈ [1 : K]. (3)
Upon receiving the query Q
[k]
n , DBn returns an answer A
[k]
n to the user, which is a function of the
corresponding query and the data stored in the DBn, i.e.,
H(A[k]n |Q[k]n , Zn) = 0, ∀k ∈ [1 : K], ∀n ∈ [1 : N ]. (4)
From all of the answers from databases, the user must be able to correctly decode the desired
message Wk with a small probability of error, i.e., the following correctness constraint must be
satisfied
H(Wk|A[k]1 , . . . , A[k]N , Q[k]1 , . . . , Q[k]N ) = o(L), ∀k ∈ [1 : K], (5)
where o(L) represents a function of L such that o(L)/L approaches 0 as L approaches infinity. In
order to prevent the database DBn from learning the identity of requested message, privacy must
be guaranteed through the following statistical equivalent constraint for all k1 6= k2 ∈ [1 : K]:
(Q[k1]n , A
[k1]
n ,W1, . . . ,WK , Z1, . . . , ZN ) ∼ (Q[k2]n , A[k2]n ,W1, . . . ,WK , Z1, . . . , ZN ). (6)
In other words, the index of the desired message k must be hidden from the query and answer of
DBn as well as all the messages and the storage content of other databases, i.e.,
I(k;Q[k]n , A
[k]
n ,W1, . . . ,WK , Z1, . . . , ZN ) = 0. (7)
For a storage parameter µ, we say that a pair (D,L) is achievable if there exists a PIR scheme
with storage, querying, and decoding functions, which satisfy the storage, correctness and privacy
constraints in (2), (5) and (6), respectively. The performance of a PIR scheme is characterized by
the number of bits of desired information per downloaded bit. In particular, if D is the total number
6
of downloaded bits, and L is the size of the desired message, then the normalized downloaded cost
is D/L. In other words, the PIR rate is L/D. The goal is to characterize the optimal normalized
download cost as a function of the database storage parameter µ:
D∗(µ) = min {D/L : (D,L) is achievable}. (8)
The storage-constrained capacity of PIR is the inverse of the normalized download cost,
C∗(µ) = max {L/D : (D,L) is achievable}. (9)
We next present a claim which shows that the optimal download cost D∗(µ) (or the inverse of
capacity 1/C∗(µ)) is a convex function of the normalized storage µ.
Claim 1 The optimal download cost D∗(µ) is a convex function of µ. In other words, for any
(µ1, µ2), and α ∈ [0, 1], the following inequality is true:
D∗(αµ1 + (1− α)µ2) ≤ αD∗(µ1) + (1− α)D∗(µ2). (10)
Proof: Claim 1 follows from a simple memory sharing argument. Consider any two storage pa-
rameters µ1, and µ2, with optimal download costs D
∗(µ1), and D∗(µ2), respectively, then for any
storage parameter µ¯ = αµ1 + (1 − α)µ2, α ∈ [0, 1], there exists a PIR scheme which achieves a
download cost of D¯(µ¯) = αD∗(µ1) + (1 − α)D∗(µ2). This is done as follows: first, we divide each
message Wk into two partitions Wk =
{
W
(1)
k ,W
(2)
k
}
, where W
(1)
k and W
(2)
k are of size αL and
(1 − α)L, respectively. Likewise, the storage of each database Zn is divided into two partitions
Zn =
{
Z
(1)
n , Z
(2)
n
}
, where Z
(1)
n and Z
(2)
n are of size αµ1KL and (1 − α)µ2KL, respectively. Now,
for messages partitions denoted by W
(1)
k for k ∈ [1 : K] and databases partitions denoted by Z(1)n
for n ∈ [1 : N ], we can apply the PIR scheme which achieves a download cost of αD∗(µ1), while for
messages partitions denoted by W
(2)
k for k ∈ [1 : K] and databases partitions denoted by Z(2)n for
n ∈ [1 : N ], we can achieve a download cost of (1−α)D∗(µ2), which gives a total download cost of
D¯(µ¯) = αD∗(µ1) + (1 − α)D∗(µ2). Since D∗(αµ1 + (1 − α)µ2) by definition is optimal download
cost for the storage parameter µ¯, it cannot be larger than the download cost of the memory sharing
scheme, i.e., D∗(αµ1 + (1− α)µ2) ≤ D¯(µ¯) = αD∗(µ1) + (1− α)D∗(µ2), which completes the proof
of Claim 1. 
2.1 Storage Constrained PIR: Uncoded Storage Assumption
Now, we specialize the above system model for the storage constrained PIR using uncoded storage
assumption, where the databases only store uncoded functions of the K messages subject to the
storage constraint. We consider a generic uncoded placement strategy such that if we consider a
message Wk, we denote Wk,S as the set of bits of Wk that are fully stored at the databases in the
set S ⊆ [1 : N ], where |S| ≥ 1, and are not stored at any of the other databases in the set [1 : K]\S.
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As a result, we can write the content of DBn, Zn as
Zn = ∪
k∈[1:K]
∪
S⊆[1:N ]
n∈S
Wk,S . (11)
Furthermore, the message Wk consists of 2
N − 1 partitions, Wk,S , for S ∈ P([1 : N ]), where
P([1 : N ]) is the power set of all possible subsets of the set [1 : N ] not including the empty set.
Therefore, the message Wk can also be equivalently expressed as
Wk = ∪S⊆[1:N ]
|S|≥1
Wk,S . (12)
Now, let us consider Wk,S as a random variable with entropy H(Wk,S) = |Wk,S |L, and size |Wk,S |
normalized by the message size L. Therefore, the following two constraints are obtained:
• Message size constraint: The first constraint is related to the total size of all the messages,
Wk and k ∈ [1 : K], given by KL bits,
1 =
1
KL
H(W[1:K]) =
1
KL
H(W1,W2, · · · ,WK) (a)= 1
KL
K∑
k=1
H(Wk)
(b)
=
1
KL
K∑
k=1
∑
S⊆[1:N ]
|S|≥1
H(Wk,S)
=
N∑
`=1
1
K
K∑
k=1
∑
S⊆[1:N ]
|S|=`
|Wk,S | =
N∑
`=1
(
N
`
)
1
K
(
N
`
) K∑
k=1
∑
S⊆[1:N ]
|S|=`
|Wk,S |
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,x`
=
N∑
`=1
(
N
`
)
x`, (13)
where (a) follows since the messages are independent, (b) follows from (12), and x` ≥ 0 is defined
as
x`
∆
=
1
K
(
N
`
) K∑
k=1
∑
S⊆[1:N ]
|S|=`
|Wk,S |, ` ∈ [1 : N ]. (14)
• Storage constraint: The second constraint is related to the total storage of all the N databases,
which cannot exceed µNKL bits for µ ∈ [ 1K , 1],
µN ≥ 1
KL
N∑
n=1
H(Zn)
(a)
=
1
KL
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
∑
S⊆[1:N ]
n∈S
H(Wk,S)
(b)
=
1
K
K∑
k=1
∑
S⊆[1:N ]
|S|≥1
|S| |Wk,S |
=
N∑
`=1
`
K
K∑
k=1
∑
S⊆[1:N ]
|S|=`
|Wk,S | (c)=
K∑
`=1
`
(
N
`
)
x`, (15)
where (a) follows from (11), (b) is true because when we sum up the contents of the storage at all
the databases, the chunk Wk,S is counted |S| number of times, which is the number of databases
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storing this chunk, and (c) follows from the definition of x` in (14). The message size and storage
constraints defined in this sub-section will be used in the converse proofs for PIR from uncoded
storage constrained databases.
3 Main Result and Discussions
Our first result is a general information theoretic lower bound on the download cost of the PIR
problem from both coded or uncoded storage constrained databases.
Theorem 1 For the storage constrained PIR problem with N databases, K messages (of size L
bits each), and arbitrary storage Z1, Z2, . . . , ZN at the N databases, the optimal download cost is
lower bounded as follows,
D∗(µ) ≥ 1 +
N∑
n1=1
λ(N−n1,1)
n1
+
N∑
n1=1
N∑
n2=n1
λ(N−n1,2)
n1n2
+ · · ·+
N∑
n1=1
. . .
N∑
nK−1=nK−2
λ(N−n1,K−1)
n1 × · · · × nK−1 , (16)
where λ(n,k) is defined as follows,
λ(n,k)
∆
=
1
KL
(
K−1
k
)(
N
n
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n
∑
j∈[1:K]\K
H(Wj |ZN ,WK), (17)
for n ∈ [0 : N ] and k ∈ [0 : K].
Remark 1 The term λ(n,k) signifies the normalized average remaining entropy in a message after
recognizing k other messages and the storage from n databases. Henceforth, the result in Theorem 1
gives a general information theoretic lower bound on the download cost of the PIR problem, which
is valid to cover the following scenarios: a) storage constrained databases where the content of each
database can be designed for optimal PIR download cost; b) fixed storage content at the databases,
where each database possesses different set of files; and c) both coded and uncoded storage content
at the databases.
Boundary Conditions on the function λ(n,k):
• We notice that when n = N or k = K, then we get all the messages in the conditioning of
the entropy terms of λ(n,k) in (17), and therefore we get the following boundary conditions
on λ(n,k):
λ(n=N,k) = 0, ∀k ∈ [0 : K], λ(n,k=K) = 0, ∀n ∈ [0 : N ]. (18)
• We further notice that for n = 0 and all k ∈ [0 : K], then we only have messages in the
conditioning of the entropy terms in (17) which are i.i.d., therefore, we get another set of
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boundary conditions on λ(n,k):
λ(n=0,k) =
1
KL
(
K−1
k
)(
N
n
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n
∑
j∈[1:K]\K
H(Wj)
=
1
KL
(
K−1
k
)(
N
n
) K∑
j=1
∑
K⊆[1:K]\j
|K|=k
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n
L = 1, ∀k ∈ [0 : K]. (19)
• For the replicated databases case, considered in [1] where every database stores all the files,
then for the function λ(n,k) where n ∈ [1 : N ], we retain all the messages in the conditioning
of the entropy terms in (17), which gives the following conditions over λ(n,k) only valid for
the replicated databases case,
λ(n,k) = 0, ∀n ∈ [1 : N ], ∀k ∈ [0 : K]. (20)
Remark 2 We notice that for the replicated databases case considered in [1], by applying the
boundary conditions in (19) and (20) to the general lower bound in Theorem 1, we get the lower
bound previously obtained in [1] as follows,
D∗(µ = 1) ≥ 1 +
N∑
n1=1
λ(N−n1,1)
n1
+
N∑
n1=1
N∑
n2=n1
λ(N−n1,2)
n1n2
+ · · ·+
N∑
n1=1
. . .
N∑
nK−1=nK−2
λ(N−n1,K−1)
n1 × · · · × nK−1
(a)
= 1 +
N∑
n1=N
λ(N−n1,1)
n1
+
N∑
n1=N
N∑
n2=n1
λ(N−n1,2)
n1n2
+ · · ·+
N∑
n1=N
. . .
N∑
nK−1=nK−2
λ(N−n1,K−1)
n1 × · · · × nK−1
= 1 +
λ(0,1)
N
+
λ(0,2)
N2
+ · · ·+ λ(0,K−1)
NK−1
(b)
= 1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ · · ·+ 1
NK−1
, (21)
where (a) follows from the boundary conditions on λ(n,k) from replicated databases in (20), and (b)
follows from the boundary condition in (19).
The complete proof of Theorem 1 is presented in Section 4. Here, we describe the intuition
behind the proof through an example of N = 3 databases and K = 3 messages.
Example 1 We start by proving the following bound on D which was first found in [1, Lemma 1]
for N = K = 3:
D − L+ o(L) ≥ I(W[2:3];Q[1][1:3],A
[1]
[1:3]|W1). (22)
The above bound has an interesting interpretation that given message W1 is requested, then the
privacy penalty D−L is bounded by the amount of information the queries and answers tell about
the remaining messages W[2:3] after successfully decoding message W1. To prove the above bound,
we start by bounding the right hand side term as follows:
I(W[2:3];Q
[1]
[1:3],A
[1]
[1:3]|W1)
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= I(W[2:3];Q
[1]
[1:3],A
[1]
[1:3],W1)− I(W[2:3];W1)
(a)
= I(W[2:3];Q
[1]
[1:3]) + I(W[2:3];A
[1]
[1:3]|Q
[1]
[1:3]) + I(W[2:3];W1|Q
[1]
[1:3],A
[1]
[1:3])
(b)
= H(A
[1]
[1:3]|Q
[1]
[1:3])−H(A
[1]
[1:3]|Q
[1]
[1:3],W[2:3]) + I(W[2:3];W1|Q
[1]
[1:3],A
[1]
[1:3])
≤ D −H(A[1][1:3],W1|Q
[1]
[1:3],W[2:3]) +H(W1|A
[1]
[1:3],Q
[1]
[1:3],W[2:3]) + I(W[2:3];W1|Q
[1]
[1:3],A
[1]
[1:3])
= D −H(W1|Q[1][1:3],W[2:3])−H(A
[1]
[1:3]|Q
[1]
[1:3],W[1:3]) +H(W1|Q
[1]
[1:3],A
[1]
[1:3])
(c)
= D − L+ o(L), (23)
where (a) follows from the chain rule of mutual information and from the assumption that messages
are independent, (b) follows from (3) where queries are independent from messages, and (c) follows
from (4) where the answers A
[1]
[1:3] are functions of the queries Q
[1]
[1:3] and all messages and from the
decodability constraint in (5) where message W1 must be decoded from the queries Q
[1]
[1:3] and the
answers A
[1]
[1:3]. Later, we prove a more general form of this bound in Lemma 2. Using the chain
rule for mutual information in all possible orders for a permutation σ : (1, 2, 3) → (σ1, σ2, σ3), we
expand the RHS of the bound in (22) as,
I(W[2:3];Q
[1]
[1:3],A
[1]
[1:3]|W1) = I(W[2:3];Q[1]σ1 , A[1]σ1 |W1) + I(W[2:3];Q[1]σ2 , A[1]σ2 |W1, Q[1]σ1 , A[1]σ1)
+ I(W[2:3];Q
[1]
σ3 , A
[1]
σ3 |W1, Q[1]σ1 , A[1]σ1 , Q[1]σ2 , A[1]σ2) (24)
(a)
≥ I(W[2:3];Q[1]σ1 , A[1]σ1 |W1) + I(W[2:3];Q[1]σ2 , A[1]σ2 |W1, Zσ1)
+ I(W[2:3];Q
[1]
σ3 , A
[1]
σ3 |W1, Zσ1 , Zσ2), (25)
where (a) follows by bounding the second and the third terms in (24) separately as follows:
I(W[2:3];Q
[1]
σ2 ,A
[1]
σ2 |W1, Q[1]σ1 , A[1]σ1)
= H(Q[1]σ2 , A
[1]
σ2 |W1, Q[1]σ1 , A[1]σ1)−H(Q[1]σ2 , A[1]σ2 |W[1:3], Q[1]σ1 , A[1]σ1)
(a)
≥ H(Q[1]σ2 , A[1]σ2 |W1, Zσ1 , Q[1]σ1 , A[1]σ1)−H(Q[1]σ2 , A[1]σ2 |W[1:3], Zσ1 , Q[1]σ1 , A[1]σ1)
(b)
= H(Q[1]σ2 , A
[1]
σ2 |W1, Zσ1 , Q[1]σ1)−H(Q[1]σ2 , A[1]σ2 |W[1:3], Zσ1 , Q[1]σ1)
= I(W[2:3];Q
[1]
σ2 , A
[1]
σ2 |W1, Zσ1 , Q[1]σ1)
(c)
= I(W[2:3];Q
[1]
σ1 , Q
[1]
σ2 , A
[1]
σ2 |W1, Zσ1)
≥ I(W[2:3];Q[1]σ2 , A[1]σ2 |W1, Zσ1), (26)
where (a) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy (which allows us to introduce
Zσ1 in the first term), and the fact that Zσ1 is a function of W[1:3] (hence it can be introduced in
the second term); (b) follows from the fact that A
[1]
σ1 is a function of (Zσ1 , Q
[1]
σ1); and step (c) follows
from (3) where the queries are independent from the messages.
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In similar steps to (26), we bound the third term in (24) as follows:
I(W[2:3];Q
[1]
σ3 ,A
[1]
σ3 |W1,Q
[1]
σ[1:2] ,A
[1]
σ[1:2])
= H(Q[1]σ3 , A
[1]
σ3 |W1,Q
[1]
σ[1:2] ,A
[1]
σ[1:2])−H(Q[1]σ3 , A[1]σ3 |W[1:3],Q
[1]
σ[1:2] ,A
[1]
σ[1:2])
≥H(Q[1]σ3 , A[1]σ3 |W1,Zσ[1:2] ,Q
[1]
σ[1:2] ,A
[1]
σ[1:2])−H(Q[1]σ3 , A[1]σ3 |W[1:3],Zσ[1:2] ,Q
[1]
σ[1:2] ,A
[1]
σ[1:2])
=H(Q[1]σ3 , A
[1]
σ3 |W1,Zσ[1:2] ,Q
[1]
σ[1:2])−H(Q[1]σ3 , A[1]σ3 |W[1:3],Zσ[1:2] ,Q
[1]
σ[1:2])
= I(W[2:3];Q
[1]
σ3 , A
[1]
σ3 |W1,Zσ[1:2] ,Q
[1]
σ[1:2])
=I(W[2:3];Q
[1]
σ[1:3] ,A
[1]
σ3 |W1,Zσ[1:2])
≥ I(W[2:3];Q[1]σ3 , A[1]σ3 |W1,Zσ[1:2]), (27)
which completes the proof of step (a) in (25). Later in Lemma 1, we generally prove that a mutual
information with queries and answers of some databases in the conditioning can be lower bounded by
replacing the queries and the answers with the corresponding databases storage random variables.
Next, we sum (25) over all possible permutations σ ∈ [3!] to get the following bound:
I(W[2:3];Q
[1]
[1:3],A
[1]
[1:3]|W1)
≥ 1
3
3∑
i=1
I(W[2:3];Q
[1]
i , A
[1]
i |W1) +
1
6
3∑
i=1
∑
j∈[1:3]\i
I(W[2:3];Q
[1]
j , A
[1]
j |W1, Zi)
+
1
3
3∑
i=1
I(W[2:3];Q
[1]
i , A
[1]
i |W1,Z[1:3]\i)
(a)
=
1
3
3∑
i=1
I(W[2:3];Q
[2]
i , A
[2]
i |W1) +
1
6
3∑
i=1
∑
j∈[1:3]\i
I(W[2:3];Q
[2]
j , A
[2]
j |W1, Zi)
+
1
3
3∑
i=1
I(W[2:3];Q
[2]
i , A
[2]
i |W1,Z[1:3]\i)
≥ 1
3
3∑
i=1
I(W[2:3];A
[2]
i |W1, Q[2]i ) +
1
6
3∑
i=1
∑
j∈[1:3]\i
I(W[2:3];A
[2]
j |W1, Zi, Q[2]j )
+
1
3
3∑
i=1
I(W[2:3];A
[2]
i |W1,Z[1:3]\i, Q[2]i )
(b)
=
1
3
3∑
i=1
H(A
[2]
i |W1, Q[2]i ) +
1
6
3∑
i=1
∑
j∈[1:3]\i
H(A
[2]
j |W1, Zi, Q[2]j ) +
1
3
3∑
i=1
H(A
[2]
i |W1,Z[1:3]\i, Q[2]i )
(c)
≥ 1
3
H(A
[2]
[1:3]|W1,Q
[2]
[1:3]) +
1
6
3∑
i=1
H(A
[2]
[1:3]\i|W1, Zi,Q
[2]
[1:3]) +
1
3
3∑
i=1
H(A
[2]
i |W1,Z[1:3]\i,Q[2][1:3])
(d)
=
1
3
I(W[2:3];A
[2]
[1:3]|W1,Q
[2]
[1:3]) +
1
6
3∑
i=1
I(W[2:3];A
[2]
[1:3]\i|W1, Zi,Q
[2]
[1:3])
+
1
3
3∑
i=1
I(W[2:3];A
[2]
i |W1,Z[1:3]\i,Q[2][1:3])
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(e)
=
1
3
I(W[2:3];Q
[2]
[1:3],A
[2]
[1:3]|W1) +
1
6
3∑
i=1
I(W[2:3];Q
[2]
[1:3],A
[2]
[1:3]\i|W1, Zi)
+
1
3
3∑
i=1
I(W[2:3];Q
[2]
[1:3], A
[2]
i |W1,Z[1:3]\i)
(f)
=
1
3
I(W[2:3];W2,Q
[2]
[1:3],A
[2]
[1:3]|W1) +
1
6
3∑
i=1
I(W[2:3];W2,Q
[2]
[1:3],A
[2]
[1:3]\i|W1, Zi)
+
1
3
3∑
i=1
I(W[2:3];W2,Q
[2]
[1:3], A
[2]
i |W1,Z[1:3]\i) + o(L)
=
1
3
I(W[2:3];W2|W1) +
1
6
3∑
i=1
I(W[2:3];W2|W1, Zi) +
1
3
3∑
i=1
I(W[2:3];W2|W1,Z[1:3]\i)
+
1
3
I(W3;Q
[2]
[1:3],A
[2]
[1:3]|W[1:2]) +
1
6
3∑
i=1
I(W3;Q
[2]
[1:3],A
[2]
[1:3]\i|W[1:2], Zi)
+
1
3
3∑
i=1
I(W3;Q
[2]
[1:3], A
[2]
i |W[1:2],Z[1:3]\i) + o(L)
(g)
=
1
3
H(W2|W1) + 1
6
3∑
i=1
H(W2|W1, Zi) + 1
3
3∑
i=1
H(W2|W1,Z[1:3]\i) +
1
3
I(W3;Q
[2]
[1:3],A
[2]
[1:3]|W[1:2])︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Term1
+
1
6
3∑
i=1
I(W3;Q
[2]
[1:3]\i,A
[2]
[1:3]\i|W[1:2], Zi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Term2
+
1
3
3∑
i=1
I(W3;Q
[2]
i , A
[2]
i |W[1:2],Z[1:3]\i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Term3
+o(L), (28)
where (a) follows from the privacy constraint in (7) where the individual queries and answers are
invariant with respect to the requested message index; (b) and (d) follow since any answer A
[2]
i is
a function of the messages W[1:K] and the query Q
[2]
i ; (c) follows from the union bound and since
conditioning reduces entropy; (e) and (g) follow from the fact that queries are independent from the
messages; and (f) follows from the decoding constraint in (8) where W2 is decodable from Q
[2]
[1:3],
A
[2]
[1:3]\N and ZN for any N ⊆ [1 : 3]. Next, we are going to lower bound the three terms, Term1,
Term2 and Term3, in (28) separately. Bounding Term1 follows similar steps to (28) as,
Term1 = I(W3;Q
[2]
[1:3],A
[2]
[1:3]|W[1:2])
(a)
≥ 1
3
I(W3;Q
[3]
[1:3],A
[3]
[1:3]|W[1:2]) +
1
6
3∑
i=1
I(W3;Q
[3]
[1:3],A
[3]
[1:3]\i|W[1:2], Zi)
+
1
3
3∑
i=1
I(W3;Q
[3]
[1:3], A
[3]
i |W[1:2],Z[1:3]\i)
(b)
≥ 1
3
I(W3;W3,Q
[3]
[1:3],A
[3]
[1:3]|W[1:2]) +
1
6
3∑
i=1
I(W3;W3,Q
[3]
[1:3],A
[3]
[1:3]\i|W[1:2], Zi)
13
+
1
3
3∑
i=1
I(W3;W3,Q
[3]
[1:3], A
[3]
i |W[1:2],Z[1:3]\i) + o(L)
=
1
3
H(W3|W[1:2]) +
1
6
3∑
i=1
H(W3|W[1:2], Zi) +
1
3
3∑
i=1
H(W3|W[1:2],Z[1:3]\i) + o(L), (29)
where (a) follows in very similar steps to (a) → (e) in (28); and (b) follows from the decoding
constraint in (5) where W3 is decodable from Q
[3]
[1:3], A
[3]
[1:3]\N and ZN for any N ⊆ [1 : 3]. We
bound Term2 as follows:
Term2 = I(W3;Q
[2]
[1:3]\i,A
[2]
[1:3]\i|W[1:2], Zi)
(a)
=
1
2
∑
j∈[1:3]\i
[
I(W3;Q
[2]
j , A
[2]
j |W[1:2], Zi) + I(W3;Q[2]j , A[2]j |W[1:2], Zi,Q[2][1:3]\{i,j},A
[2]
[1:3]\{i,j})
]
(b)
≥ 1
2
∑
j∈[1:3]\i
[
I(W3;Q
[3]
j , A
[3]
j |W[1:2], Zi) + I(W3;Q[3]j , A[3]j |W[1:2],Z[1:3]\j)
]
≥ 1
2
∑
j∈[1:3]\i
[
I(W3;A
[3]
j |W[1:2], Zi, Q[3]j ) + I(W3;A[3]j |W[1:2],Z[1:3]\j , Q[3]j )
]
≥ 1
2
∑
j∈[1:3]\i
[
H(A
[3]
j |W[1:2], Zi, Q[3]j ) +H(A[3]j |W[1:2],Z[1:3]\j , Q[3]j )
]
≥ 1
2
H(A
[3]
[1:3]\i|W[1:2], Zi,Q
[3]
[1:3]) +
1
2
∑
j∈[1:3]\i
H(A
[3]
j |W[1:2],Z[1:3]\j ,Q[3][1:3])
(c)
=
1
2
I(W3;A
[3]
[1:3]\i|W[1:2], Zi,Q
[3]
[1:3]) +
1
2
∑
j∈[1:3]\i
I(W3;A
[3]
j |W[1:2],Z[1:3]\j , Q[3][1:3])
(d)
=
1
2
I(W3;W3,Q
[3]
[1:3],A
[3]
[1:3]\i|W[1:2], Zi)+
1
2
∑
j∈[1:3]\i
I(W3;W3,Q
[3]
[1:3], A
[3]
j |W[1:2],Z[1:3]\j)+o(L)
=
1
2
H(W3|W[1:2], Zi) +
1
2
∑
j∈[1:3]\i
H(W3|W[1:2],Z[1:3]\j) + o(L), (30)
where (a) follows from the chain rule of mutual information; (b) follows from steps similar to (26)
and (27) which we will formally prove later in Lemma 1; (c) follows since any answer A
[3]
i is a
function of the messages W[1:K] and the query Q
[3]
i ; and (d) follows from the decoding constraint
in (5). Then, we bound Term3 as follows:
Term3 = I(W3;Q
[2]
i , A
[2]
i |W[1:2],Z[1:3]\i)
≥ I(W3;A[2]i |W[1:2],Z[1:3]\i, Q[2]i )
(a)
= H(A
[2]
i |W[1:2],Z[1:3]\i, Q[2]i )
≥ H(A[2]i |W[1:2],Z[1:3]\i,Q[2][1:3])
(b)
= I(W3;A
[2]
i |W[1:2],Z[1:3]\i,Q[2][1:3])
(c)
= I(W3;W3,Q
[2]
[1:3], A
[2]
i |W[1:2],Z[1:3]\i) + o(L)
= H(W3|W[1:2],Z[1:3]\i) + o(L), (31)
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where (a) and (b) follows since any answer A
[2]
i is a function of the messages W[1:K] and the query
Q
[2]
i ; and (c) follows from the decoding constraint in (5).
Using the lower bounds (29), (30) and (31) in (28) and hence use the resultant bound in (22),
we arrive to the following bound:
D ≥L+ 1
3
H(W2|W1) + 1
9
H(W3|W[1:2]) +
1
6
3∑
i=1
H(W2|W1, Zi) + 1
3
3∑
i=1
H(W2|W1,Z[1:3]\i)
+
5
36
3∑
i=1
H(W3|W[1:2], Zi) +
11
18
3∑
i=1
H(W3|W[1:2],Z[1:3]\i) + o(L). (32)
By repeating the bounding procedure in (22) with any permutation of the messages indexes
pi : (1, 2, 3)→ (pi1, pi2, pi3), we get a more general bound on D:
D ≥L+ 1
3
H(Wpi2 |Wpi1) +
1
9
H(Wpi3 |Wpi[1:2]) +
1
6
3∑
i=1
H(Wpi2 |Wpi1 , Zi) +
1
3
3∑
i=1
H(Wpi2 |Wpi1 ,Z[1:3]\i)
+
5
36
3∑
i=1
H(Wpi3 |Wpi[1:2] , Zi) +
11
18
3∑
i=1
H(Wpi3 |Wpi[1:2] ,Z[1:3]\i) + o(L). (33)
Now, if we sum up (33) over all permutations pi ∈ [3!], we obtain,
D ≥ L+ 1
6
∑
K⊆[1:3]
|K|=1
∑
k∈[1:3]\K
(
1
3
H(Wk|WK) + 1
6
3∑
i=1
H(Wk|WK, Zi) + 1
3
3∑
i=1
H(Wk|WK,Z[1:3]\i)
)
+
1
6
∑
K⊆[1:3]
|K|=2
∑
k∈[1:3]\K
(
2
9
H(Wk|WK) + 5
18
3∑
i=1
H(Wk|WK, Zi)+11
9
3∑
i=1
H(Wk|WK,Z[1:3]\i)
)
+ o(L)
= L+
1
3
λ(0,1)L+
1
2
λ(1,1)L+ λ(2,1)L+
2
18
λ(0,2)L+
5
12
λ(1,2)L+
11
6
λ(2,2)L+ o(L), (34)
where λ(n,k) is defined in (17).
Since the bound in (33) is valid for any achievable pair (D,L), it is also a valid bound on the
optimal normalized download cost, D∗(µ), as defined in (8), where µ ∈ [13 , 1]. Therefore, by taking
the limit L→∞, we obtain the following bound on D∗(µ):
D∗(µ) ≥ D
L
≥ 1 + 1
3
λ(0,1) +
1
2
λ(1,1) + λ(2,1) +
2
18
λ(0,2) +
5
12
λ(1,2) +
11
6
λ(2,2), (35)
which proves Theorem 1 for N = K = 3.
The following Theorem summarizes the second main result of this paper, which characterizes
the information theoretically optimal download cost of the PIR problem from uncoded storage
constrained databases as a function of the available storage.
Theorem 2 For the uncoded storage constrained PIR problem with N databases, K messages (of
size L bits each), and a per database storage constraint of µKL bits, the information-theoretically
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µ1
N
2
N
t
N 1
K
D(µ)
(Storage)
(Download Cost)
1 +
1
2
+ · · · + 1
2K 1
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Figure 2: The optimal trade-off between storage and download cost for uncoded storage constrained
PIR.
optimal trade-off between storage and download cost is given by the lower convex hull of the following
(µ,D∗(µ)) pairs, for t = 1, 2, . . . , N :(
µ =
t
N
, D∗(µ) = D˜(t)
)
, (36)
where D˜(t) is defined as follows for t ∈ [1 : N ]:
D˜(t)
∆
=
K−1∑
k=0
1
tk
. (37)
Remark 3 The general optimal trade-off resulting from Theorem 2 is illustrated in Figure 2. The
smallest value of µ = 1/N corresponds to the parameter t = 1, for which the optimal download
cost is maximal and is equal to K, corresponding to download all the messages from the databases.
The other extreme value of storage is µ = 1, corresponding to t = N , i.e., the setting of full storage
in which every database can store all the messages. For this case, the optimal download cost was
characterized in [1] as (1 + 1N +
1
N2
+ · · ·+ 1
NK−1 ). The PIR download cost for the storage values
in between outperforms memory sharing between the two extremes, i.e., lower than the line joining
between them.
We briefly describe here the main elements of the achievability and the converse proof of Theo-
rem 2 through an example of N = 3 databases and K = 3 messages. The general achievable scheme
and the converse proof, for any (N,K) and any µ, are described in Sections 5, and 6, respectively.
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Figure 3: Optimal trade-off between download and storage for (N,K) = (3, 3). Following Theorem
2, the trade-off has three corner points, labeled as P1, P2 and P3.
Example 2 Figure 3 shows the optimal trade-off between download cost and storage for N = K =
3. Following Theorem 2, the trade-off has three corner points as shown in Figure 3 (labeled as P1,
P2 and P3). We can make the following interesting observations from this figure:
1. The storage point µ = 1 (or point P3) corresponds to replicated databases, for which the
optimal download cost is the same as that in [1].
2. The storage point µ = 1/N (or point P1) corresponds to the minimum value of storage, for
which the optimal scheme is to download all messages to ensure privacy.
3. For intermediate values, i.e., 1/N < µ < 1, the optimal trade-off outperforms memory sharing
between P1 and P3.
Converse Proof– From Figure 3, it is clear that we need to need to prove the following two lower
bounds on the download cost:
D∗(µ) ≥ 17− 15µ
4
, D∗(µ) ≥ 85− 33µ
36
. (38)
To this end, we now specialize the lower bound in (35) for the case of uncoded storage placement
as defined in Section 2.1 to write the bound in (34) as follows:
D ≥ L+ 1
6
∑
K⊆[1:3]
|K|=1
∑
k∈[1:3]\K
(
1
3
H(Wk|WK) + 1
6
3∑
i=1
H(Wk|WK, Zi) + 1
3
3∑
i=1
H(Wk|WK,Z[1:3]\i)
)
+
1
6
∑
K⊆[1:3]
|K|=2
∑
k∈[1:3]\K
(
2
9
H(Wk|WK) + 5
18
3∑
i=1
H(Wk|WK, Zi)+11
9
3∑
i=1
H(Wk|WK,Z[1:3]\i)
)
+ o(L)
(a)
= L+
1
6
∑
K⊆[1:3]
|K|=1
∑
k∈[1:3]\K
(
1
3
H(Wk) +
1
6
3∑
i=1
H(Wk|Zi) + 1
3
3∑
i=1
H(Wk|Z[1:3]\i)
)
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+
1
6
∑
K⊆[1:3]
|K|=2
∑
k∈[1:3]\K
(
2
9
H(Wk) +
5
18
3∑
i=1
H(Wk|Zi)+11
9
3∑
i=1
H(Wk|Z[1:3]\i)
)
+ o(L)
= L+
1
6
3∑
k=1
 ∑
K⊆[1:3]\k
|K|=1
(
1
3
H(Wk) +
1
6
3∑
i=1
H(Wk|Zi) + 1
3
3∑
i=1
H(Wk|Z[1:3]\i)
)
+
∑
K⊆[1:3]\k
|K|=2
(
2
9
H(Wk) +
5
18
3∑
i=1
H(Wk|Zi)+11
9
3∑
i=1
H(Wk|Z[1:3]\i)
)+ o(L)
= L+
4
27
3∑
k=1
H(Wk) +
11
108
3∑
i=1
3∑
k=1
H(Wk|Zi) + 17
54
3∑
i=1
3∑
k=1
H(Wk|Z[1:3]\i) + o(L), (39)
where step (a) follows since the messages are i.i.d. and using the uncoded storage content given in
(11). Next, we use the representation of the message Wk for uncoded storage given in (12) to write
the lower bound in (39) in terms of x` defined in (14) as follows,
D
(a)
≥ L+ 4
27
3∑
k=1
∑
S⊆[1:3]
|S|≥1
|Wk,S |L+ 11
108
3∑
i=1
3∑
k=1
∑
S⊆[1:3]\i
|S|≥1
|Wk,S |L+ 17
54
3∑
i=1
3∑
k=1
|Wk,{i}|L+ o(L)
=L+
2
3
3∑
k=1
∑
S⊆[1:3]
|S|=1
|Wk,S |L+ 1
4
3∑
k=1
∑
S⊆[1:3]
|S|=2
|Wk,S |L+ 4
27
3∑
k=1
∑
S⊆[1:3]
|S|=3
|Wk,S |L+ o(L)
(b)
= L+ 6x1L+
9
4
x2L+
4
9
x3L+ o(L), (40)
where (a) follows from (12); and (b) follows from the definition of x` in (14).
Since the bound in (40) is valid for any achievable pair (D,L), it is also a valid bound on
the optimal normalized download cost, D∗(µ), as defined in (8), where µ ∈ [13 , 1]. Therefore, by
dividing (40) and taking the limit L→∞, we obtain the following bound on D∗(µ):
D∗(µ) ≥ 1 + 6x1 + 9
4
x2 +
4
9
x3. (41)
Moreover, the message size, and the storage constraints for uncoded storage placement for this
example N = K = 3 follow from (13), and (15), respectively. Hence, we obtain the following
constraints:
3x1 + 3x2 + x3 = 1, (42)
3x1 + 6x2 + 3x3 ≤ 3µ. (43)
We get the first lower bound on D∗(µ), given in (38), in two steps. First, we use the message
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size constraint in (42) to remove x1 from (41) and (42) and get two bounds,
D∗(µ) ≥ 3− 15
4
x2 − 14
9
x3, (44)
3µ ≥ 1 + 3x2 + 2x3. (45)
Then, we use (45) to bound x2 in (44) and get
D∗(µ) ≥ 17− 15µ
4
+
17
18
x3
(a)
≥ 17− 15µ
4
, (46)
where (a) follows since x3 ≥ 0.
We get the second lower bound on D∗(µ), given in (38), by eliminating the variables (x2, x3).
First, we use the message size constraint in (42) to remove x2 from (41) and (42) and get two
bounds,
D∗(µ) ≥ 7
4
+
15
4
x1 − 11
36
x3, (47)
3µ ≥ 2− 3x1 + x3. (48)
Then, we use (48) to bound x3 in (47) and get
D∗(µ) ≥ 85− 33µ
36
+
17
6
x1
(a)
≥ 85− 33µ
36
, (49)
where (a) follows since x1 ≥ 0.
Proving the two bounds in (46) and (49) completes the converse proof for N = 3, and K = 3.
Achievable Scheme– The optimal trade-off is achieved by memory sharing between different PIR
schemes (see Claim 1), which are designed for three values of storage µ ∈ {1/3, 2/3, 1}. Consider
without loss of generality, that the user wants to privately retrieve message W1.
• Case P1 (t = 1 or µ = 1/3):
Storage Placement: For this point, we assume that each message is of size L = 13 × (31) = 3
bits. Hence, the storage constraint for each database is µKL = 3 bits. In particular, we split
each message into
(
3
1
)
= 3 sub-messages and label each by a unique subset of [1 : 3] of size
t = 1, i.e., Wk = {Wk,{1},Wk,{2},Wk,{3}} for k ∈ [1 : 3], and each sub-message is of size 13 = 1
bits. Subsequently, DBn stores those sub-messages (of each message) whose index contains n. For
instance, DB1 stores {W1,{1},W2,{1},W3,{1}}. Hence, the total storage required per database is 3
bits, which satisfies the storage constraint.
PIR Scheme: The PIR scheme is trivial for this storage point, where in order to maintain privacy
all the messages should be downloaded from the databases for any message request. Hence, the
download cost for this scheme is given as D(µ = 13) =
9
3 = 3, and point P1 is achieved.
• Case P2 (t = 2 or µ = 2/3):
Storage Placement: The storage placement here is inspired by the storage placement strategy for
caching systems in [28]. For this storage point, we assume that each message is of size L = 23×(32) =
24 bits. Hence, the storage constraint for each database is µKL = 48 bits. In particular, we split
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each message into
(
3
2
)
= 3 sub-messages and label each by a unique subset of [1 : 3] of size t = 2,
i.e., Wk = {Wk,{1,2},Wk,{1,3},Wk,{2,3}} for k ∈ [1 : 3]. Each sub-message is of size 23 = 8 bits, i.e.,
Wk,S = (w1k,S , . . . , w
8
k,S) for k ∈ [1 : 3] and S is a subset of [1 : 3] of size 2. We can write the bits
representation of the 3 messages as:
W1 = {(w11,{1,2}, . . . , w81,{1,2}), (w11,{1,3}, . . . , w81,{1,3}), (w11,{2,3}, . . . , w81,{2,3})},
W2 = {(w12,{1,2}, . . . , w82,{1,2}), (w12,{1,3}, . . . , w82,{1,3}), (w12,{2,3}, . . . , w82,{2,3})},
W3 = {(w13,{1,2}, . . . , w83,{1,2}), (w13,{1,3}, . . . , w83,{1,3}), (w13,{2,3}, . . . , w83,{2,3})}. (50)
Subsequently, DBn stores those sub-messages (of each message) whose index contains n. For in-
stance, DB1 stores {W1,{1,2},W1,{1,3},W2,{1,2},W2,{1,3},W3,{1,2},W3,{1,3}}. Hence, the total storage
required per database is 6× 8 = 48 bits, which satisfies the storage constraint.
PIR Scheme: For every k ∈ [1 : 3] and S ⊂ [1 : 3] where |S| = 2, let (u1k,S , u2k,S , . . . , u8k,S) represents
a random permutation of the bits of the sub-message Wk,S according to the permutation δk,S :
(1, 2, . . . , 8) → (δk,S1 , δk,S2 , . . . , δk,S8 ), i.e., uik,S = w
(δk,Si )
k,S for i ∈ [1 : 8]. The storage constraint PIR
scheme is shown in Table 1. It works in 3 blocks, where in every block, only 2 databases are
involved given by DBi and i ∈ S for every S ⊂ [1 : 3] where |S| = 2. We can label each block by
the set S including the databases involved. In the block S, the user only downloads bits from the
sub-messages Wk,S for k ∈ [1 : 3]. Each block is divided into three stages described next for the
block S = {1, 2}. Similar steps can be followed for the two other blocks {1, 3} and {2, 3}.
Table 1: Storage Constrained PIR: (N,K) = (3, 3), µ = tN =
2
3
Blocks DB1 DB2 DB3
Block 1
S = {1, 2}
u11,{1,2}, u
1
2,{1,2}, u
1
3,{1,2} u
2
1,{1,2}, u
2
2,{1,2}, u
2
3,{1,2} -
u31,{1,2} + u
2
2,{1,2} u
5
1,{1,2} + u
1
2,{1,2} -
u41,{1,2} + u
2
3,{1,2} u
6
1,{1,2} + u
1
3,{1,2} -
u32,{1,2} + u
3
3,{1,2} u
4
2,{1,2} + u
4
3,{1,2} -
u71,{1,2}+u
4
2,{1,2}+u
4
3,{1,2} u
8
1,{1,2}+u
3
2,{1,2}+u
3
3,{1,2}
Block 2
S = {1, 3}
u11,{1,3}, u
1
2,{1,3}, u
1
3,{1,3} - u
2
1,{1,3}, u
2
2,{1,3}, u
2
3,{1,3}
u31,{1,3} + u
2
2,{1,3} - u
5
1,{1,3} + u
1
2,{1,3}
u41,{1,3} + u
2
3,{1,3} - u
6
1,{1,3} + u
1
3,{1,3}
u32,{1,3} + u
3
3,{1,3} - u
4
2,{1,3} + u
4
3,{1,3}
u71,{1,3}+u
4
2,{1,3}+u
4
3,{1,3} - u
8
1,{1,3}+u
3
2,{1,3} + u
3
3,{1,3}
Block 3
S = {2, 3}
- u11,{2,3}, u
1
2,{2,3}, u
1
3,{2,3} u
2
1,{2,3}, u
2
2,{2,3}, u
2
3,{2,3}
- u31,{2,3} + u
2
2,{2,3} u
5
1,{2,3} + u
1
2,{2,3}
- u41,{2,3} + u
2
3,{2,3} u
6
1,{2,3} + u
1
3,{2,3}
- u32,{2,3} + u
3
3,{2,3} u
4
2,{2,3} + u
4
3,{2,3}
- u71,{2,3}+u
4
2,{2,3}+u
4
3,{2,3} u
8
1,{2,3}+u
3
2,{2,3}+u
3
3,{2,3}
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Stage 1: In first stage of the block {1, 2}, single bits from the messages are downloaded from
DB1 and DB2. From DB1, the user downloads 1 desired bits u
1
1,{1,2}, then 2 undesired bits
{u12,{1,2}, u12,{1,3}} to confuse the database on which message is requested by maintaining message
symmetry. Similarly, the bits {u21,{1,2}, u22,{1,2}, u23,{1,2}} are downloaded from DB2.
Stage 2: In the second stage of the block {1, 2}, the undesired bits downloaded from the Stage
1 can be paired with new desired bits. It is important to notice that the undesired bits cannot
be repeatedly acquired from the same database, otherwise the symmetry in the queries across
messages, and hence the privacy, will be violated. Therefore, the number of new desired bits to be
downloaded from DB1 in this stage is limited to the number of undesired bits downloaded in Stage
1 from DB2, and vice versa. From DB1, the user can download 2 coded desired symbols {u31,{1,2}+
u22,{1,2}, u
4
1,{1,2} + u
2
3,{1,2}}. In order to confuse the database, the user maintains the symmetry
in the downloaded message by downloading one more undesired coded symbols u32,{1,2} + u
3
3,{1,2}.
Similarly, the following coded bits are downloaded from DB2: {u51,{1,2} + u12,{1,2}, u61,{1,2} + u13,{1,2},
u42,{1,2} + u
4
3,{1,2}}.
Stage 3: In the third stage, the second order undesired symbols downloaded from Stage 2 are used
to be paired up with new useful bits of the desired message and download third order coded symbols
(triples) from the databases. From DB1, since u
4
2,{1,2}+u
4
3,{1,2} is an undesired side information bit
at the user downloaded from DB2 in Stage 2, it can be paired with a new desired bit of W1, u
7
1,{1,2},
i.e., download u71,{1,2}+u
4
2,{1,2}+u
4
3,{1,2}. Similarly, the user downloads the u
8
1,{1,2}+u
3
2,{1,2}+u
3
3,{1,2}
from DB2.
Remark 4 Each blocks of the storage constrained PIR scheme for the point P2, i.e., (N = 3,
K = 3, t = 2) can be viewed as doing the original PIR scheme proposed in [1] for t = 2 databases
and N = 3 messages. This is enabled by our storage placement scheme inspired by the the work on
coded caching [28].
We can readily verify that from the 14 bits downloaded in every block S, the user is able to
correctly retrieve the 8 bits of the corresponding desired sub-message W1,S . In total, the user
downloads 3×14 = 42 coded bits in the three blocks in order to privately retrieve the 24 bits of the
desired message W1. Hence, we can achieve a download cost for this scheme D(µ =
2
3) =
42
24 = 7/4,
and point P2 is achieved.
• Case P3 (t = 3 or µ = 1):
Storage Placement: This storage point is the replicated databases case considered in [1]. We describe
it here for the sake of completeness. The storage placement is trivial in this case, where all the
databases can store the 3 messages completely. Each message is assumed to be of size L = 33×(33) =
27 bits, e.g., W1 = (w
1
1,{1,2,3}, w
2
1,{1,2,3}, . . . , w
27
1,{1,2,3}).
PIR Scheme: For every k ∈ [1 : 3], let (u1k,{1,2,3}, u2k,{1,2,3}, . . . , u27k,{1,2,3}) represents a random
permutation of the bits of the sub-message Wk,{1,2,3} according to the permutation δk,{1,2,3} :
(1, 2, . . . , 27) → (δk,{1,2,3}1 , δk,{1,2,3}2 , . . . , δk,{1,2,3}27 ), i.e., uik,{1,2,3} = w
(δ
k,{1,2,3}
i )
k,{1,2,3} for i ∈ [1 : 27]. The
PIR scheme works in three stages as shown in Table 2.
Stage 1: In first stage, single bits from the messages are downloaded. From DB1, the user down-
loads 1 desired bits u11,{1,2,3}, then 2 undesired bits {u12,{1,2,3}, u13,{1,2,3}} to confuse the database
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Table 2: Storage Constrained PIR: (N,K) = (3, 3), µ = tN = 1
DB1 DB2 DB3
u11,{1,2,3}, u
1
2,{1,2,3}, u
1
3,{1,2,3} u
2
1,{1,2,3}, u
2
2,{1,2,3}, u
2
3,{1,2,3} u
3
1,{1,2,3}, u
3
2,{1,2,3}, u
3
3,{1,2,3}
u41,{1,2,3} + u
2
2,{1,2,3} u
8
1,{1,2,3} + u
1
2,{1,2,3} u
12
1,{1,2,3} + u
1
2,{1,2,3}
u51,{1,2,3} + u
2
3,{1,2,3} u
9
1,{1,2,3} + u
1
3,{1,2,3} u
13
1,{1,2,3} + u
1
3,{1,2,3}
u42,{1,2,3} + u
4
3,{1,2,3} u
6
2,{1,2,3} + u
6
3,{1,2,3} u
8
2,{1,2,3} + u
8
3,{1,2,3}
u61,{1,2,3} + u
3
2,{1,2,3} u
10
1,{1,2,3} + u
3
2,{1,2,3} u
14
1,{1,2,3} + u
2
2,{1,2,3}
u71,{1,2,3} + u
3
3,{1,2,3} u
11
1,{1,2,3} + u
3
3,{1,2,3} u
15
1,{1,2,3} + u
2
3,{1,2,3}
u52,{1,2,3} + u
5
3,{1,2,3} u
7
2,{1,2,3} + u
7
3,{1,2,3} u
9
2,{1,2,3} + u
9
3,{1,2,3}
u161,{1,2,3} + u
6
2,{1,2,3} + u
6
3,{1,2,3} u
20
1,{1,2,3} + u
4
2,{1,2,3} + u
4
3,{1,2,3} u
24
1,{1,2,3} + u
4
2,{1,2,3} + u
4
3,{1,2,3}
u171,{1,2,3} + u
7
2,{1,2,3} + u
7
3,{1,2,3} u
21
1,{1,2,3} + u
5
2,{1,2,3} + u
5
3,{1,2,3} u
25
1,{1,2,3} + u
5
2,{1,2,3} + u
5
3,{1,2,3}
u181,{1,2,3} + u
8
2,{1,2,3} + u
8
3,{1,2,3} u
22
1,{1,2,3} + u
8
2,{1,2,3} + u
8
3,{1,2,3} u
26
1,{1,2,3} + u
6
2,{1,2,3} + u
6
3,{1,2,3}
u191,{1,2,3} + u
9
2,{1,2,3} + u
9
3,{1,2,3} u
23
1,{1,2,3} + u
9
2,{1,2,3} + u
9
3,{1,2,3} u
27
1,{1,2,3} + u
7
2,{1,2,3} + u
7
3,{1,2,3}
on which message is requested by maintaining message symmetry. Similarly, {u21,{1,2,3} ,u22,{1,2,3},
u23,{1,2,3}} and {u31,{1,2,3}, u32,{1,2,3}, u33,{1,2,3}} are downloaded from DB2 and DB3 respectively.
Stage 2: In the second stage, the undesired bits downloaded from the first stage can be paired
with new desired bits. For instance, the user can download 4 desired bits from DB1 by requesting
4 second order coded symbols (pairs) paired up with the undesired bits downloaded from DB2 and
DB3 in Stage 1, as follows: {u41,{1,2,3}+u22,{1,2,3}, u51,{1,2,3}+u23,{1,2,3}, u61,{1,2,3}+u32,{1,2,3}, u71,{1,2,3}+
u33,{1,2,3}}. In order to confuse the database the user maintains the symmetry in the downloaded
message by downloading 2 undesired coded symbols {u42,{1,2,3} + u43,{1,2,3}, u52,{1,2,3} + u53,{1,2,3}}.
Stage 3: In the third stage, the undesired coded pairs downloaded from Stage 2 are used to
be paired up with new useful bits of the desired message and download coded triples from the
databases. For instance, the user can download 4 desired bits from DB1, {u161,{1,2,3}, u171,{1,2,3},
u181,{1,2,3}, u
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1,{1,2,3}}, by requesting 4 coded triples paired up with the undesired coded bits down-
loaded from DB2 and DB3 in Stage 2, as shown in Table 2.
We can readily verify that from the 39 bits downloaded from all three databases, the user is
able to correctly retrieve the 27 bits of message W1. Hence, we can achieve a download cost for
this scheme D(µ = 1) = 3927 = 13/9, and point P3 is achieved.
Finally, the intermediate values of µ, between the points P1, P2, and P3, can be achieved by
memory-sharing (see Claim 1), showing that the lower convex hull given in Figure 3 is achievable,
and that the scheme is information-theoretically optimal for N = 3, and K = 3.
4 Proof of Theorem 1: General Lower Bound on D∗(µ)
We start by proving the following Lemma, which provides an information theoretic bound useful
in many steps of the general converse proof.
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Lemma 1 For any N ⊆ [1 : N ], K ⊆ [1 : K], i ∈ [1 : N ], and j ∈ [1 : K] we can write the following
lower bound:
I(W[1:K]\K;Q
[j]
i , A
[j]
i |WK,Q[j]N ,A[j]N ) ≥ I(W[1:K]\K;Q[j]i , A[j]i |WK,ZN ). (51)
Remark 5 Lemma 1 lower bounds the mutual information I(W[1:K]\K;Q
[j]
i , A
[j]
i |WK,Q[j]N ,A[j]N ) by
replacing the queries and answers Q
[j]
N ,A
[j]
N in the conditioning, with the storage contents of the
corresponding subset of databases ZN . This Lemma is repeatedly used in our converse proof for the
download cost.
Proof:
I(W[1:K]\K;Q
[j]
i , A
[j]
i |WK,Q[j]N ,A[j]N )
= H(Q
[j]
i , A
[j]
i |WK,Q[j]N ,A[j]N )−H(Q[j]i , A[j]i |W[1:K],Q[j]N ,A[j]N )
(a)
= H(Q
[j]
i , A
[j]
i |WK,Q[j]N ,A[j]N )−H(Q[j]i , A[j]i |W[1:K],Q[j]N ,A[j]N ,ZN )
(b)
≥ H(Q[j]i , A[j]i |WK,Q[j]N ,A[j]N ,ZN )−H(Q[j]i , A[j]i |W[1:K],Q[j]N ,A[j]N ,ZN )
(c)
= H(Q
[j]
i , A
[j]
i |WK,Q[j]N ,ZN )−H(Q[j]i , A[j]i |W[1:K],Q[j]N ,ZN )
= I(Q
[j]
i , A
[j]
i ;W[1:K]\K|WK,Q[j]N ,ZN )
(d)
= I(Q
[j]
N , Q
[j]
i , A
[j]
i ;W[1:K]\K|WK,ZN )
≥ I(W[1:K]\K;Q[j]i , A[j]i |WK,ZN ), (52)
where (a) follows from the fact that the random variables ZN are functions of all the messages
W[1:K]; (b) follows since conditioning reduces entropy; (c) follows since the answers A
[j]
N are func-
tions of the storage random variables ZN and the queries Q
[j]
N ; and (d) follows from fact that queries
Q
[j]
N are independent from the messages stored at the databases. 
The following Lemma gives a lower bound on the number of downloaded bits D in terms of the
summation of a mutual information term of the form I(W[1:K]\K;Q
[j]
i , A
[j]
i |WK,ZN ). Notice that
this is the same term appears in right side of the bound in Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 The download cost D of the storage-constrained PIR is lower bounded as follows:
D ≥ L+
N−1∑
n=0
T (n, 1) + o(L), (53)
where T (n, k) for n ∈ [0 : N ] and k ∈ [0 : K] is defined as follows:
T (n, k)
∆
=
1
NK
(
K−1
k
)(
N−1
n
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n
∑
j∈[1:K]\K
∑
i∈[1:N ]\N
I(W[1:K]\K;Q
[j]
i , A
[j]
i |WK,ZN ). (54)
We notice that when n = N or k = K, then we get all the messages in the conditioning of the
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mutual information term above, and therefore we get the following boundary conditions on T (n, k):
T (n = N, k) = 0, ∀k ∈ [0 : K], T (n, k = K) = 0, ∀n ∈ [0 : N ]. (55)
Proof:
We start by obtaining the following bound for all k ∈ [1 : K]:
I(W[1:K]\k;Q
[k]
[1:N ],A
[k]
[1:N ]|Wk)
= I(W[1:K]\k;Q
[k]
[1:N ],A
[k]
[1:N ],Wk)− I(W[1:K]\k;Wk)
(a)
= I(W[1:K]\k;Q
[k]
[1:N ]) + I(W[1:K]\k;A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q
[k]
[1:N ]) + I(W[1:K]\k;Wk|Q
[k]
[1:N ],A
[k]
[1:N ])
(b)
= H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q
[k]
[1:N ])−H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|W[1:K]\k,Q
[k]
[1:N ]) + I(W[1:K]\k;Wk|Q
[k]
[1:N ],A
[k]
[1:N ])
= H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|Q
[k]
[1:N ])−H(A
[k]
[1:N ],Wk|W[1:K]\k,Q
[k]
[1:N ]) +H(Wk|W[1:K]\k,Q
[k]
[1:N ],A
[k]
[1:N ])
+ I(W[1:K]\k;Wk|Q[k][1:N ],A
[k]
[1:N ])
≤ D −H(Wk|W[1:K]\k,Q[k][1:N ])−H(A
[k]
[1:N ]|W[1:K],Q
[k]
[1:N ]) +H(Wk|Q
[k]
[1:N ],A
[k]
[1:N ])
(c)
= D − L+ o(L), (56)
where (a) follows from the chain rule of mutual information and from the fact that the messages
are i.i.d., (b) follows from (3) where queries are not functions of the messages; (c) follows from
(4) where answers are functions of the messages and the corresponding queries and also from the
decodability constraint in (5), where Wk is decodable from Q
[k]
[1:N ] and A
[k]
[1:N ]. Summing up the
obtained bound in (56) over k ∈ [1 : K], we get the following bound:
D ≥ L+ 1
K
K∑
k=1
I(W[1:K]\k;Q
[k]
[1:N ],A
[k]
[1:N ]|Wk) + o(L)
= L+
1
K
1
N !
K∑
k=1
∑
σ∈[N !]
I(W[1:K]\k;Q
[k]
σ[1:N ] ,A
[k]
σ[1:N ] |Wk) + o(L)
(a)
= L+
1
K
1
N !
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
∑
σ∈[N !]
I(W[1:K]\k;Q[k]σn , A
[k]
σn |Wk,Q[k]σ[1:n−1] ,A[k]σ[1:n−1])+o(L)
(b)
≥ L+ 1
K
1
N !
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
∑
σ∈[N !]
I(W[1:K]\k;Q[k]σn , A
[k]
σn |Wk,Zσ[1:n−1])+o(L)
(c)
= L+
1
K(K − 1)
1
N !
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
∑
j∈[1:K]\k
∑
σ∈[N !]
I(W[1:K]\k;Q[j]σn , A
[j]
σn |Wk,Zσ[1:n−1])+o(L)
= L+
1
K
(
K−1
1
) 1
N !
N∑
n=1
∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=1
∑
j∈[1:K]\K
∑
σ∈[N !]
I(W[1:K]\K;Q[j]σn , A
[j]
σn |WK,Zσ[1:n−1])+o(L)
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(d)
= L+
N∑
n=1
∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=1
∑
j∈[1:K]\K
(N − n)!(n− 1)!
K
(
K−1
1
)
N !
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n−1
∑
i∈[1:N ]\N
I(W[1:K]\K;Q
[j]
i , A
[j]
i |WK,ZN )+o(L)
= L+
N−1∑
n=0
1
KN
(
N−1
n
)(
K−1
1
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=1
∑
j∈[1:K]\K
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n
∑
i∈[1:N ]\N
I(W[1:K]\K;Q
[j]
i , A
[j]
i |WK,ZN )+o(L)
(e)
= L+
N−1∑
n=0
T (n, 1) + o(L), (57)
where (a) follows from chain rule of mutual information; (b) follows from Lemma 1; (c) follows from
the privacy constraint in (7) where the individual queries and answers are invariant with respect to
the requested message index; (d) follows from the symmetry with respect to the summation indexes,
where for every set N ⊆ [1 : N ] of size (n−1) and every i ∈ [1 : N ]\N , the number of permutations
σ that lead to the mutual information I(W[1:K]\K;Q
[j]
i , A
[j]
i |WK,ZN ) is (N − n)!(n− 1)!; and (e)
follows from the definition of T (n, k) in (54). 
In order to utilize the bound developed in Lemma 2, we further lower bound the function T (n, k)
in the following Lemma. This lower bound on T (n, k) has an interesting recursive structure, which
in turn allows us to leverage the boundary conditions (55) of the function T (n, k) and thus obtain
a closed-form lower bound on the download cost.
Lemma 3 The function T (n, k) is lower bounded as follows:
T (n, k) ≥ 1
N − n
[
N−1∑
n′=n
T (n′, k + 1) + λ(n,k)L
]
+ o(L), (58)
where λ(n,k) as defined in (17),
λ(n,k)
∆
=
1
KL
(
K−1
k
)(
N
n
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n
∑
j∈[1:K]\K
H(Wj |ZN ,WK), (59)
for n ∈ [0 : N ] and k ∈ [0 : K].
Proof:
We start by bounding T (n, k) defined in (55) as follows,
T (n, k)
=
1
NK
(
K−1
k
)(
N−1
n
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n
∑
j∈[1:K]\K
∑
i∈[1:N ]\N
I(W[1:K]\K;Q
[j]
i , A
[j]
i |WK,ZN )
(a)
=
1
NK
(
K−1
k
)(
N−1
n
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n
∑
j∈[1:K]\K
∑
i∈[1:N ]\N
I(W[1:K]\K;A
[j]
i |WK,ZN , Q[j]i )
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(b)
=
1
NK
(
K−1
k
)(
N−1
n
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n
∑
j∈[1:K]\K
∑
i∈[1:N ]\N
H(A
[j]
i |WK,ZN , Q[j]i )
(c)
≥ 1
NK
(
K−1
k
)(
N−1
n
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n
∑
j∈[1:K]\K
∑
i∈[1:N ]\N
H(A
[j]
i |WK,ZN ,Q[j][1:N ])
≥ 1
NK
(
K−1
k
)(
N−1
n
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n
∑
j∈[1:K]\K
H(A
[j]
[1:N ]\N |WK,ZN ,Q
[j]
[1:N ])
(d)
=
1
NK
(
K−1
k
)(
N−1
n
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n
∑
j∈[1:K]\K
I(W[1:K]\K;A
[j]
[1:N ]\N |WK,ZN ,Q
[j]
[1:N ])
(e)
=
1
NK
(
K−1
k
)(
N−1
n
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n
∑
j∈[1:K]\K
I(W[1:K]\K;Q
[j]
[1:N ],A
[j]
[1:N ]\N |WK,ZN )
(f)
≥ 1
NK
(
K−1
k
)(
N−1
n
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n
∑
j∈[1:K]\K
I(W[1:K]\K;Wj ,Q
[j]
[1:N ],A
[j]
[1:N ]\N |WK,ZN ) + o(L)
=
1
NK
(
K−1
k
)(
N−1
n
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n
∑
j∈[1:K]\K
I(W[1:K]\K;Q
[j]
[1:N ],A
[j]
[1:N ]\N |WK,ZN ,Wj)
+
1
NK
(
K−1
k
)(
N−1
n
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n
∑
j∈[1:K]\K
H(Wj |WK,ZN ) + o(L)
(g)
=
1
NK
(
K−1
k
)(
N−1
n
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n
∑
j∈[1:K]\K
I(W[1:K]\(K∪j);Q
[j]
[1:N ]\N ,A
[j]
[1:N ]\N |W(K∪j),ZN )
+
1
N − nλ(n,k)L+ o(L)
=
1
NK
(
K−1
k
)(
N−1
n
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k+1
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n
∑
j∈K
I(W[1:K]\K;Q
[j]
[1:N ]\N ,A
[j]
[1:N ]\N |WK,ZN )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T˜ (n,k)
+
1
N − nλ(n,k)L+ o(L), (60)
where (a) and (e) follow from the fact that queries are independent from the messages; (b) and
(d) follow from the fact that answers are functions of all the messages; (c) is because conditioning
reduces entropy; (f) follows from the decoding constraint in (5) where Wj is decodable from Q
[j]
[1:N ],
A
[j]
[1:N ]\N and ZN ; and (g) follows from the definition of λ(n,k) in (17) and since the queries Q
[j]
N are
independent from the messages. We further lower bound T (n, k) by bounding the term T˜ (n, k) in
(60) as follows,
T˜ (n, k) =
1
NK
(
K−1
k
)(
N−1
n
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k+1
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n
∑
j∈K
I(W[1:K]\K;Q
[j]
[1:N ]\N ,A
[j]
[1:N ]\N |WK,ZN )
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(a)
=
1
NK
(
K−1
k
)(
N−1
n
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k+1
∑
j∈K
1
n!(N − n)!
∑
σ∈[N !]
I(W[1:K]\K;Q
[j]
σ[n+1:N ] ,A
[j]
σ[n+1:N ] |WK,Zσ[1:n])
(b)
=
1
N !K
(
K−1
k
)
(N − n)
∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k+1
∑
j∈K
∑
σ∈[N !]
N−1∑
n′=n
I(W[1:K]\K;Q[j]σn′+1 , A
[j]
σn′+1 |WK,Zσ[1:n] ,Q
[j]
σ[n+1:n′] ,A
[j]
σ[n+1:n′])
(c)
≥ 1
N !K
(
K−1
k
)
(N − n)
∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k+1
∑
j∈K
∑
σ∈[N !]
N−1∑
n′=n
I(W[1:K]\K;Q[j]σn′+1 , A
[j]
σn′+1 |WK,Zσ[1:n′])
(d)
=
N−1∑
n′=n
1
N !K
(
K−1
k
)
(N − n)
∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k+1
∑
j∈K
n′!(N − n′ − 1)!
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n′
∑
i∈[1:N ]\N
I(W[1:K]\K;Q
[j]
i , A
[j]
i |WK,ZN )
(e)
=
1
N − n
N−1∑
n′=n
1
NK
(
K−1
k
)(
N−1
n′
) ∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n′
∑
i∈[1:N ]\N
∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k+1
∑
j∈K
∑
j′∈[1:K]\K
I(W[1:K]\K;Q
[j′]
i , A
[j′]
i |WK,ZN )
K − k − 1
=
1
N − n
N−1∑
n′=n
1
NK
(
K−1
k+1
)(
N−1
n′
) ∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N|=n′
∑
i∈[1:N ]\N
∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k+1
∑
j′∈[1:K]\K
I(W[1:K]\K;Q
[j′]
i , A
[j′]
i |WK,ZN )
(f)
=
1
N − n
N−1∑
n′=n
T (n′, k + 1), (61)
where (a) and (d) follow from a similar argument to step (d) in (57); (b) follows by applying the
chain rule of entropy; (c) follows by applying Lemma 1; (e) follows from the privacy constraint in
(7) where the individual queries and answers are invariant with respect to the requested message
index; and (f) follows from the definition of T (n, k) in (54). By applying the lower bound on the
term T˜ (n, k) in (61) to the lower bound on T (n, k) in (60) we conclude the proof of Lemma 3. 
Now, we use the recursive lower bound on T (n, k) given in Lemma 3 to further lower bound the
download cost on D obtained in Lemma 2 as follows:
D ≥ L+
N−1∑
n1=0
T (n1, 1) + o(L)
≥ L+
N−1∑
n1=0
1
N − n1
(
λ(n1,1)L+
N−1∑
n2=n1
T (n2, 2)
)
+ o(L)
≥ L+
N−1∑
n1=0
λ(n1,1)L
N − n1 +
N−1∑
n1=0
N−1∑
n2=n1
1
(N − n1)(N − n2)
(
λ(n2,2)L+
N−1∑
n3=n2
T (n3, 3)
)
+ o(L)
...
≥L+
N−1∑
n1=0
λ(n1,1)L
N − n1 +
N−1∑
n1=0
N−1∑
n2=n1
λ(n2,2)L
(N − n1)(N − n2) +
N−1∑
n1=0
N−1∑
n2=n1
N−1∑
n3=n2
λ(n3,3)L
(N − n1)(N − n2)(N − n3)
+ · · ·+
N−1∑
n1=0
. . .
N−1∑
nK−1=nK−2
λ(nK−1,K−1)L+
∑N−1
nK=nK−1 T (nK ,K)
(N − n1)× · · · × (N − nK−1) + o(L)
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(a)
= L+
N−1∑
n1=0
λ(n1,1)L
N − n1 +
N−1∑
n1=0
N−1∑
n2=n1
λ(n2,2)L
(N − n1)(N − n2) +
N−1∑
n1=0
N−1∑
n2=n1
N−1∑
n3=n2
λ(n3,3)L
(N − n1)(N − n2)(N − n3)
+ · · ·+
N−1∑
n1=0
. . .
N−1∑
nK−1=nK−2
λ(nK−1,K−1)L
(N − n1)× · · · × (N − nK−1) + o(L)
(b)
= L+
N∑
n1=1
λ(N−n1,1)L
n1
+
N∑
n1=1
N−n1∑
n2=1
λ(N−n2,2)L
n1n2
+ · · ·+
N∑
n1=1
. . .
N−nK−2∑
nK−1=1
λ(N−nK−1,K−1)L
n1 × · · · × nK−1 + o(L)
(c)
= L+
N∑
n1=1
λ(N−n1,1)L
n1
+
N∑
n1=1
N∑
n2=n1
λ(N−n1,2)L
n1n2
+ · · ·+
N∑
n1=1
. . .
N∑
nK−1=nK−2
λ(N−n1,K−1)L
n1 × · · · × nK−1 + o(L),
(62)
where (a) follows by applying the boundary condition on T (n, k) as given in (55), where T (n, k =
K) = 0 for n ∈ [0 : N − 1]; and (b) and (c) follow by simple changing of the summation indexes.
Taking the limit L → ∞, we obtain the bound on DL , which is also a valid bound on the optimal
normalized download cost, D∗(µ), as defined in (8) for µ ∈ [ 1N , 1], since the bound in (70) is valid
for any achievable pair (D,L). Therefore, we obtain the following bound on D∗(µ),
D∗(µ) ≥ 1 +
N∑
n1=1
λ(N−n1,1)
n1
+
N∑
n1=1
N∑
n2=n1
λ(N−n1,2)
n1n2
+ · · ·+
N∑
n1=1
. . .
N∑
nK−1=nK−2
λ(N−n1,K−1)
n1 × · · · × nK−1 , (63)
which completes the proof of Theorem 1.
5 Proof of Theorem 2: Lower Bounds for Uncoded Storage Con-
strained Databases and General (N,K, µ)
We now specialize the lower bound in (62) for the case of uncoded storage placement as defined in
Section 2.1. Using the uncoded storage content given in (11), and since the messages are i.i.d., the
following relation is already satisfied,
H(Wj/ZN ,WK) = H(Wj/ZN ) =
∑
S⊆[1:N ]\N
|S|≥1
|Wj,S |L, (64)
for every K ⊆ [1 : K], N ⊆ [1 : N ], and j ∈ [1 : K] \ K. Therefore, the term λ(n,k) as defined in
(17) can be expressed as,
λ(n,k) =
1
K
(
K−1
k
)(
N
n
) ∑
K⊆[1:K]
|K|=k
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N |=n
∑
j∈[1:K]\K
H(Wj/ZN )
=
1
K
(
K−1
k
)(
N
n
) ∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N |=n
K∑
j=1
∑
K⊆[1:K]\{j}
|K|=k
H(Wj/ZN ) =
1
K
(
N
n
) ∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N |=n
K∑
j=1
H(Wj/ZN ). (65)
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We notice that λ(n,k) is independent of k, and hence we can define λn
∆
= λ(n,k), for all k ∈ [1 : K].
Therefore, we can write the bound in (62) as follows,
D ≥ L+
N∑
n1=1
 1
n1
+
N∑
n2=n1
1
n1n2
+ · · ·+
N∑
n2=n1
. . .
N∑
nK−1=nK−2
1
n1 × · · · × nK−1
λN−n1 + o(L)
= L+
N∑
n1=1
S(n1,K) λN−n1 + o(L), (66)
where S(n, k), for n ∈ [1 : N ] and k ∈ [1 : K], is defined as follows,
S(n, k)
∆
=
1
n
+
N∑
n2=n
1
nn2
+ · · ·+
N∑
n2=n
. . .
N∑
nk−1=nk−2
1
nn2 × · · · × nk−1 . (67)
It is important to notice the following boundary conditions and properties of S(n, k):
Property 1: S(n, k = 1) = 0, Property 2: S(n, k = 2) =
1
n
,
Property 3: nS(n = N, k) = S(n = N, k − 1) + 1,
Property 4: nS(n, k)− (n+ 1)S(n+ 1, k) = S(n, k − 1). (68)
The first 3 properties are straight forward to prove from the definition of S(n, k) in (67). The forth
property of S(n, k) provides a useful recursive relation and can be proved as follows:
nS(n, k)− (n+ 1)S(n+ 1, k)
(a)
=
1 + N∑
n2=n
1
n2
+
N∑
n2=n
N∑
n3=n2
1
n2n3
+ · · ·+
N∑
n2=n
· · ·
∑
nk−1=nk−2
1
n2 × · · · × nk−1

−
1 + N∑
n2=n+1
1
n2
+
N∑
n2=n+1
N∑
n3=n2
1
n2n3
+ · · ·+
N∑
n2=n+1
· · ·
∑
nk−1=nk−2
1
n2 × · · · × nk−1

=
1
n
+
N∑
n3=n
1
nn3
+
N∑
n3=n
N∑
n4=n3
1
nn3n4
+ · · ·+
N∑
n3=n
· · ·
N∑
nk−1=nk−2
1
nn3 × · · · × nk−1
(b)
=
1
n
+
N∑
n2=n
1
nn2
+
N∑
n2=n
N∑
n3=n2
1
nn2n3
+ · · ·+
N∑
n2=n
· · ·
N∑
nk−2=nk−3
1
nn2 × · · · × nk−2
(c)
= S(n, k − 1), (69)
where (a) and (c) follow from the definition of S(n, k) in (67); and (b) follows by simple relabeling
of the summation indexes.
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Next, we express the λn term that appears in (66) in terms of x` as defined in (14) as follows,
λn =
1
K
(
N
n
) ∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N |=n
K∑
k=1
H(Wk/ZN )
(a)
=
1
K
(
N
n
) ∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N |=n
K∑
k=1
∑
S⊆[1:N ]\N
|S|≥1
|Wk,S |L
=
1
K
(
N
n
) N−n∑
`=1
K∑
k=1
∑
N⊆[1:N ]
|N |=n
∑
S⊆[1:N ]\N
|S|=`
|Wk,S |L = 1
K
(
N
n
) N−n∑
`=1
K∑
k=1
∑
S⊆[1:N ]
|S|=`
∑
N⊆[1:N ]\S
|N |=n
|Wk,S |L
=
1
K
(
N
n
) N−n∑
`=1
K∑
k=1
∑
S⊆[1:N ]
|S|=`
(
N − `
n
)
|Wk,S |L
=
N−n∑
`=1
(
N − n
`
)
1
K
(
N
`
) K∑
k=1
∑
S⊆[1:N ]
|S|=`
|Wk,S |L =
N−n∑
`=1
(
N − n
`
)
x`L, (70)
where (a) follows from (64). Substituting with (70) in (66) and taking the limit L→∞, we obtain
the bound on DL in terms of x` as follows,
D
L
≥ 1 +
N∑
n1=1
n1∑
`=1
(
n1
`
)
S(n1,K) x` = 1 +
N∑
`=1
N∑
n1=`
(
n1
`
)
S(n1,K) x` = 1 +
N∑
`=1
α(`,K) x`, (71)
where α(`, k) for ` ∈ [1 : N ] and k ∈ [1 : K] is defined as follows,
α(`, k)
∆
=
N∑
n=`
(
n
`
)
S(n, k). (72)
Since the bound in (70) is valid for any achievable pair (D,L), it is also a valid bound on the
optimal normalized download cost, D∗(µ), as defined in (8), where µ ∈ [ 1N , 1]. Therefore, we obtain
the following bound on D∗(µ),
D∗(µ) ≥ 1 +
N∑
`=1
α(`,K) x`. (73)
Next, we use the properties of S(n, k) in (68) to obtain a recursion relation for α(`, k) as
introduced in the following Lemma:
Lemma 4 The function α(`, k) satisfies the following recursion relation:
α(`, k) =
1
`
[
α(`, k − 1) +
(
N
`
)]
. (74)
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Proof:
α(`, k)
(a)
=
N∑
n=`
(
n
`
)
S(n, k) =
1
`
N∑
n=`
(
n− 1
`− 1
)
nS(n, k)
=
1
`
[
N∑
n=`
(
n− 1
`− 1
)
nS(n, k) +
N∑
n=`+1
(
n− 1
`
)
nS(n, k)−
N∑
n=`+1
(
n− 1
`
)
nS(n, k)
]
=
1
`
[
N∑
n=`
(
n
`
)
nS(n, k)−
N−1∑
n=`
(
n
`
)
(n+ 1)S(n+ 1, k)
]
=
1
`
[
N−1∑
n=`
(
n
`
)
[nS(n, k)− (n+ 1)S(n, k)] +
(
N
`
)
NS(N, k)
]
(b)
=
1
`
[
N−1∑
n=`
(
n
`
)
S(n, k − 1) +
(
N
`
)
NS(N, k − 1) +
(
N
`
)]
=
1
`
[
N∑
n=`
(
n
`
)
S(n, k − 1) +
(
N
`
)]
(c)
=
1
`
[
α(`, k − 1) +
(
N
`
)]
, (75)
where (a) and (c) follow from the definition of α(`, k) in (72); and (b) follows from properties 3 and
4 in (68). 
Next, we use the recursion relation for α(`, k) given in Lemma 4 to obtain a closed form expres-
sion for the coefficients α(`,K), for ` ∈ [1 : N ], in terms of the system parameters as follows:
α(`,K) =
1
`
(
α(`,K − 1) +
(
N
`
))
=
1
`
(
N
`
)
+
1
`2
(
α(`,K − 2) +
(
N
`
))
...
=
(
N
`
)(
1
`
+
1
`2
+ · · ·+ 1
`K−1
)
=
(
N
`
)(
D˜(`)− 1
)
, (76)
which follows by applying the boundary condition on α(`, k) where α(`, k = 1) = 0, and D˜(`) =∑K−1
k=0
1
`k
as defined in (37). Therefore, the bound in (73) can be written as
D∗(µ) ≥ 1 +
N∑
`=1
(
N
`
)(
D˜(`)− 1
)
x`. (77)
Next, we obtain N − 1 different lower bounds on D∗(µ), by eliminating the pairs (xj−1, xj), for
each j ∈ [1 : N − 1], in the equation (77) using the message size, and the storage constraints for
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uncoded storage placement given in (13), and (15), respectively. We use (13) to write xj as follows:
xj =
1(
N
j
)
1− ∑
`∈[1:N ]\j
(
N
`
)
x`
 . (78)
We first apply (78) in (77) to obtain
D∗(µ) ≥ 1 +
∑
`∈[1:N ]\j
(
N
`
)(
D˜(`)− 1
)
x` +
1− ∑
`∈[1:N ]\j
(
N
`
)
x`
(D˜(j)− 1)
= D˜(j) +
∑
`∈[1:N ]\j
(
N
`
)(
D˜(`)− D˜(j)
)
x`. (79)
We next apply (78) in the storage constraint (15) to obtain
µN ≥
∑
`∈[1:N ]\j
`
(
N
`
)
x` + j
1− ∑
`∈[1:N ]\j
(
N
`
)
x`
 = j + ∑
`∈[1:N ]\j
(
N
`
)
(`− j)x`. (80)
In order to eliminate xj+1 from (79), we first use (80) to bound xj+1 as
xj+1 ≤ 1( N
j+1
)
µN − j − ∑
`∈[1:N ]\{j,j+1}
(
N
`
)
(`− j)x`
 , (81)
which can be applied in (79) to obtain the following bound on D∗(µ),
D∗(µ) ≥ D˜(j) +
∑
`∈[1:N ]\j
(
N
`
)(
D˜(`)− D˜(j)
)
x`
(a)
≥ D˜(j) +
∑
`∈[1:N ]\{j,j+1}
(
N
`
)(
D˜(`)− D˜(j)
)
x`
+
(
D˜(j + 1)− D˜(j)
)µN − j − ∑
`∈[1:N ]\{j,j+1}
(
N
`
)
(`− j)x`

(b)
= (µN − j)D˜(j + 1)− (µN − j − 1)D˜(j) +
∑
`∈[1:N ]\{j,j+1}
(
N
`
)
Γ
(j)
` x`
(c)
≥ (µN − j)D˜(j + 1)− (µN − j − 1)D˜(j), (82)
where (a) follows from (81) where the coefficient D˜(j+ 1)− D˜(j) is negative for all j ∈ [1 : N − 1];
Γ
(j)
` for ` ∈ [1 : N ] \ {j, j + 1} in (b) is defined as
Γ
(j)
`
∆
= D˜(`) + (`− j − 1)D˜(j)− (`− j)D˜(j + 1); (83)
and (c) since x` and Γ
(j)
` are non-negative for ` ∈ [1 : N ] \ {j, j + 1}, which can be shown in the
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following discussion. In order to prove that Γ
(j)
` is non-negative for ` ∈ [1 : N ] \ {j, j + 1}, we first
need to prove an important property for D˜(`) in the following Lemma:
Lemma 5 D˜(`)−D˜(`+1) is non increasing with respect to `, i.e., D˜(`′)−D˜(`′+1) ≥ D˜(`)−D˜(`+1),
for any `′ ≤ `.
Proof: In order to prove Lemma 5, it is sufficient to prove that D˜(`′)− D˜(`′+1) ≥ D˜(`)− D˜(`+1)
for `′ = `− 1, or D˜(`− 1)− 2D˜(`) + D˜(`+ 1) ≥ 0. The proof for any `′ ≤ ` follows by induction.
D˜(`− 1)− 2D˜(`) + D˜(`+ 1) =
K−1∑
j=0
1
(`− 1)j +
1
(`+ 1)j
− 2
(`)j
(a)
≥ 2
K−1∑
j=0
1
(`2 − 1)j/2 −
1
(`)j
= 2
K−1∑
j=0
(`2)j/2 − (`2 − 1)j/2
(`)j(`2 − 1)j/2 ≥ 0, (84)
where, (a) follows from the AM-GM inequality, i.e., arithmetic mean is larger than geometric mean,
that is x1+x22 ≥ (x1x2)1/2, ∀x1, x2 ≥ 0. Therefore, we obtain D˜(` − 1) − D˜(`) ≥ D˜(`) − D˜(` + 1),
which completes the proof of the Lemma. 
• Case ` < j: We prove that Γ(j)` ≥ 0 for ` < j as follows,
Γ
(j)
` = D˜(`) + (`− j − 1)D˜(j)− (`− j)D˜(j + 1)
=
[
D˜(`)− D˜(j)
]
− (j − `)
[
D˜(j)− D˜(j + 1)
]
=
j−1∑
i=`
[
D˜(i)− D˜(i+ 1)
]
− (j − `)
[
D˜(j)− D˜(j + 1)
]
=
j−1∑
i=`
([
D˜(i)− D˜(i+ 1)
]
−
[
D˜(j)− D˜(j + 1)
])
(a)
≥
j−1∑
i=`
([
D˜(j)− D˜(j + 1)
]
−
[
D˜(j)− D˜(j + 1)
])
= 0, (85)
where (a) follows from Lemma 5.
• Case ` > j + 1: Similar to the case ` < j, we prove Γ(j)` ≥ 0 for ` > j + 1 as follows,
Γ
(j)
` = D˜(`) + (`− j − 1)D˜(j)− (`− j)D˜(j + 1)
= (`− j − 1)
[
D˜(j)− D˜(j + 1)
]
−
[
D˜(j + 1)− D˜(`)
]
= (`− j − 1)
[
D˜(j)− D˜(j + 1)
]
−
∑`
i=j+2
[
D˜(i− 1)− D˜(i)
]
=
∑`
i=j+2
([
D˜(j)− D˜(j + 1)
]
−
[
D˜(i− 1)− D˜(i)
])
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(a)
≥
∑`
i=j+2
([
D˜(j)− D˜(j + 1)
]
−
[
D˜(j)− D˜(j + 1)
])
= 0, (86)
where (a) follows from Lemma 5.
From (82) we arrive to the following lower bound on D∗(µ):
D∗(µ) ≥ (µN − j)D˜(j + 1)− (µN − j − 1)D˜(j), (87)
which is a linear function of µ for a fixed value of j ∈ [1 : N − 1] passing through the two points:
(µ1 =
j
N ,
D
L = D˜(j)) and (µ2 =
j+1
N ,
D
L = D˜(j + 1)). We obtain N − 1 such lower bounds for every
j ∈ [1 : N − 1], which eventually give the lower bound on the optimal download cost D∗(µ) as the
lower convex envelope of the following N points:(
µ =
t
N
,
D
L
= D˜(t) = 1 +
1
t
+
1
t2
+ · · ·+ 1
tK−1
)
, ∀t ∈ [1 : N ], (88)
which completes the converse proof of Theorem 2.
6 Proof of Theorem 2: Achievability for General (N,K, µ)
The achievability proof of the optimal download cost given in Theorem 2 has two main parts: a)
the storage design (i.e., what to store across N databases) subject to storage constraints; and b)
the design of the PIR scheme from storage constrained databases. We next describe our placement
scheme while satisfying the storage constraint at each database. In particular, we focus on the
storage points µKL for µ = t/N and t ∈ [1 : N ]. Once we achieve a scheme for these storage
points, the lower convex envelope is also achieved using memory sharing as discussed in Claim 1.
6.1 Storage Placement Scheme for µ = t/N and t ∈ [1 : N ]
This storage placement scheme is inspired by the placement strategy proposed in the work on coded
caching [28]. For a fixed parameter t ∈ [1 : N ], we take each message Wk and sub-divide it into(
N
t
)
equal sized sub-messages. We then label each sub-message with a unique subset S ⊆ [1 : N ] of
size t. Therefore, the message Wk can be expressed as:
Wk = ∪S⊆[1:N ]
|S|=t
Wk,S . (89)
Using this message splitting scheme, we propose the databases storage placement scheme as follows:
for every message, each database stores all sub-messages which contain its index. For instance,
consider an example of t = 2, N = 3 databases, and K = 2 messages (say W1, and W2). We first
sub-divide the two messages into
(
3
2
)
= 3 sub-messages as W1 = {W1,{1,2},W1,{2,3},W1,{1,3}}, and
W2 = {W2,{1,2},W2,{2,3},W2,{1,3}}. Therefore, the storage scheme is as follows:
• DB1 stores Z1 = {W1,{1,2},W1,{1,3},W2,{1,2},W2,{1,3}};
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Table 3: Fixed query structure to DBn: Total vs. desired downloaded bits
Blocks Stages Tuple Total bits Useful bits
Block 1
S = {n} ∪ {1, 2, . . . , t− 1}
Stage 1 Single
(
K
1
)
(t− 1)0 (K−10 )(t− 1)0
Stage 2 Pair
(
K
2
)
(t− 1)1 (K−11 )(t− 1)1
...
...
...
...
Stage k k-tuple
(
K
k
)
(t− 1)k−1 (K−1k−1 )(t− 1)k−1
...
...
...
...
Stage K K-tuple
(
K
K
)
(t− 1)K−1 (K−1K−1)(t− 1)K−1
Block 2
S = {n} ∪ {1, 2, . . . , t− 2, t}
Stage 1 Single
(
K
1
)
(t− 1)0 (K−10 )(t− 1)0
...
...
...
...
Stage k k-tuple
(
K
k
)
(t− 1)k−1 (K−1k−1 )(t− 1)k−1
...
...
...
...
Stage K K-tuple
(
K
K
)
(t− 1)K−1 (K−1K−1)(t− 1)K−1
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Block
(
N−1
t−1
)
S = {n} ∪ {N − t+ 2, . . . , N}
Stage 1 Single
(
K
1
)
(t− 1)0 (K−10 )(t− 1)0
...
...
...
...
Stage k k-tuple
(
K
k
)
(t− 1)k−1 (K−1k−1 )(t− 1)k−1
...
...
...
...
Stage K K-tuple
(
K
K
)
(t− 1)K−1 (K−1K−1)(t− 1)K−1
• DB2 stores Z2 = {W1,{1,2},W1,{2,3},W2,{1,2},W2,{2,3}};
• DB3 stores Z3 = {W1,{1,3},W1,{2,3},W2,{1,3},W2,{2,3}}.
Furthermore, we assume that each sub-message is of size tK bits. Hence the total size of each
message, L, is given as L =
(
N
t
)
tK . We next verify that the above scheme satisfies the storage
constraint. To this end, we note that for every message, each database stores
(
N−1
t−1
)
sub-messages
(this corresponds to the number of sub-sets of databases of size t in which the given database is
present). Hence, the total storage necessary for any database is given as:
K︸︷︷︸
Total number
of messages
×
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Number of submessages
per message per database
× tK︸︷︷︸
Size of each
submessage
=
t
N
×K ×N ×
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
× tK−1
=
t
N
×K ×
((
N
t
)
tK
)
=
t
N
×K × L = µKL.
This shows that the proposed scheme satisfies the storage constraints for every database.
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6.2 Storage Constrained PIR Scheme for µ = t/N and t ∈ [1 : N ]
We now present the storage constrained PIR scheme for any (N,K) introduced in our previous
work [27]. We focus on the storage parameter µ = t/N for any t ∈ [1 : N ]. The general ideas of
the scheme are described in the following points:
• Fixed Query Structure: We assume a fixed query structure at each database independent of
the desired message Wi, where the query set Q
[i]
n to each DBn is structured as follows: The query
Q
[i]
n is composed of
(
N−1
t−1
)
blocks, where every block is labeled by a set S ∈ [1 : N ] of size t, where
n ∈ S. The query block labeled with S only involves the sub-messages stored at the databases DBn
where n ∈ S, i.e., Wk,S for k ∈ [1 : K]. Subsequently, since |S| = t, there are t databases sharing
each block labeled with S. Every query block is composed of a sequence K ordered stages, where
in Stage k, the user requests k-tuple coded bits composed of k bits from k different files, WK for
K ∈ [1 : K] and |K| = k. There are (Kk ) such types of k-tuples, and each type is designed to contain
(t−1)k−1 coded bits. The summary of the query structure per database is shown in Table 3, where
the query set to each database is composed of
(
N−1
t−1
)
blocks, each contains K ordered stages, each
Stage k contains
(
K
k
)
types of k-tuples, and each type is a set of (t− 1)k−1 coded bits. In total, the
query involves a total number of
(
N−1
t−1
)∑K
k=1
(
K
k
)
(t− 1)k−1 requested coded bits.
• Privacy Guarantees: The query structure for the Stage k, Block S and DBn is shown in
Table 4. In order to maintain privacy, we introduce message symmetry such that any query stage
must be symmetric with respect to all the messages. Looking at Stage k within any block in
Table 4, out of the
(
K
k
)
(t− 1)k−1 coded bits requested, the desired message Wi is participating in(
K−1
k−1
)
(k−1)k−1 coded bits, which are referred to as desired symbols. The user must download some
extra undesired bits of the other messages in order to maintain symmetry, which are referred to as
side-information, given by the remaining
(
K−1
k
)
(k− 1)k−1 coded bits. Furthermore, we restrict our
scheme not to download the same bit multiple times from the same database, otherwise the privacy
constraint may be violated. In addition to the symmetric structure of the queries, before initializing
the PIR scheme, the user assumes a random permutation of the bits for each sub-message Wk,S
according to δk,S : (1, 2, . . . , L)→ (δk,S1 , δk,S2 , . . . , δk,StK ). This procedure will become clear when we
discuss the stages of the PIR scheme.
• Exploiting Side Information: At each stage k, the user uses the side information downloaded
during the previous stage k − 1 to pair with new desired bits. However, the side information
downloaded from a database at Stage k− 1 cannot be used to download new desired bits from the
same database in Stage k in order to maintain privacy. In other words, the number of desired bits
that can be downloaded from a database, say DBn, at Stage k is given by the side information
downloaded from the remaining databases at the Stage k − 1, and also stored within DBn. The
exploitation of side-information is carefully designed to account for the limited storage capabilities
of the databases. At stage k, when the user downloads a k-tuple coded bit, he only pairs bits
that belong to the same set of database S, such that the resultant coded bit is available at all the
databases who indexes are in the set S. The resultant coded bits belong to the query block labeled
by S as discussed before in Table 3, and henceforth we treat the sub-messages that are stored in the
same set of databases S independently in the PIR scheme. In Table 4, we demonstrate the types
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Table 4: Fixed query structure to DBn during Block S, Stage k: Total vs. desired downloaded bits
Types Instance No. k-tuple Coded Symbols Total bits
Type 1
K = {i} ∪ {1, 2, . . . , k − 1}
1 n(Wi,S) + s(
∑
j∈K\{i}Wj,S)
(Desired bits)(
K−1
k−1
)
(t− 1)k−1
2 n(Wi,S) + s(
∑
j∈K\{i}Wj,S)
...
...
(t− 1)k−1 n(Wi,S) + s(
∑
j∈K\{i}Wj,S)
...
...
...
Type
(
K−1
k−1
)
K = {i} ∪ {K − k + 2, . . . ,K}
1 n(Wi,S) + s(
∑
j∈K\{i}Wj,S)
2 n(Wi,S) + s(
∑
j∈K\{i}Wj,S)
...
...
(t− 1)k−1 n(Wi,S) + s(
∑
j∈K\{i}Wj,S)
Type
(
K−1
k−1
)
+ 1
K = {1, 2, . . . , k}
(i 6∈ K)
1
∑
j∈K n(Wj,S)
(Side Info.)(
K−1
k
)
(t− 1)k−1
2
∑
j∈K n(Wj,S)
...
...
(t− 1)k−1 ∑j∈K n(Wj,S)
...
...
...
Type
(
K
k
)
K = {K − k + 1, . . . ,K}
(i 6∈ K)
1
∑
j∈K n(Wj,S)
2
∑
j∈K n(Wj,S)
...
...
(t− 1)k−1 ∑j∈K n(Wj,S)
of bits requested from DBn during Stage k in a block characterized by S, where n ∈ S. We use
the notation n(Wj,S) to denote a new bit of Wj,S that has not been downloaded from any database
before; while s(
∑
j∈K\{i}Wj,S) where |K| = k denotes a side information coded bit the user already
downloaded from the previous Stage k − 1 from other database. It is important to note here that
the side information bits are considered fresh from DBn perspective.
• Detailed Description of the stages: As we discussed before, for every DBn and a desired
message Wi, the query set Q
[i]
n is divided into
(
N−1
t−1
)
blocks labeled with sets S ⊆ [1 : N ] and
n ∈ S. Each block S is composed only of the sub-messages Wk,S , where k ∈ [1 : K], and the
databases in the set S. The user assumes a random permutation of the bits for each sub-message
Wk,S according to δk,S : (1, 2, . . . , L)→ (δk,S1 , δk,S2 , . . . , δk,StK ), i.e., considering the sub-message bits
in the order
(
w
(
δk,S1
)
k,S , w
(
δk,S2
)
k,S , . . . , w
(
δk,S
tK
)
k,S
)
. As demonstrated in Table 3, the user chooses the
new bits of the sub-message n(Wj,S) according to the permutation δj,S , e.g., the following sequence
of calls (n(W1,S),n(W2,S),n(W1,S) + n(W2,S)) correspond to
(
w
(δ1,S1 )
1,S , w
(δ2,S1 )
2,S , w
(δ1,S2 )
1,S + w
(δ2,S2 )
1,S
)
.
Considering Block S, we present the K stages of the general PIR scheme for DBn in details, and
assume that the user is interested in privately retrieving message Wi.
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Stage 1: In the first stage, the user starts by downloading single uncoded bits from DBn. The
user first downloads one bit from the desire sub-message Wi,S . In order to maintain privacy, we
introduce message symmetry, and the user downloads one bit from remaining K − 1 sub-messages,
Wj,S where j ∈ [1 : K] \ i. As a summary as shown in the first row of each Block in Table 3, the
user downloads in total
(
K
1
)
bits, out of which the number of desired bits are
(
K−1
0
)
= 1. The total
number of bits downloaded of each sub-message Wj,S across all databases DBn′ , where n′ ∈ S \{n},
is given as
(
K−1
0
)
(t− 1), and for all undesired sub-messages Wj,S , where j ∈ [1 : K] \ {i}, we obtain(
K−1
1
)
(t− 1) undesired bits as side information to be used to get desired bits from DBn in the next
stage, Stage 2.
Stage 2: In the second stage, the user downloads pairs of bits, where the desired bits are coded
with the undesired bits previously downloaded as side information from Stage 1. As previously
discussed, the number of desired bits that can be downloaded from DBn is given by the side
information downloaded from the remaining databases at Stage 1, which is given by
(
K−1
1
)
(t − 1)
bits. Furthermore, in order to maintain message symmetry, the user downloads extra coded pairs
of undesired bits, which will form the side information of the next stage. For every one of the
(
K−1
2
)
undesired pair types, i.e., K ⊆ [1 : K] \ {i} and |K| = 2, the user downloads (t− 1) bits from DBn,
or total
(
K−1
2
)
(t − 1) undesired bits. As a summary as shown in the second row of each Block in
Table 3, the user downloads from DBn in total
(
K
2
)
(t− 1) bits, out of which the number of desired
bits are
(
K−1
1
)
(t− 1). The total number of undesired pairs downloaded across all databases DBn′ ,
where n′ ∈ S \{n}, is given as (K−12 )(t− 1)2 as side information to be used to get desired bits from
DBn in the next stage, Stage 3.
Stage k: In the general Stage k, we download k-tuples of bits composed of k different messages.
The total number of undesired side information obtained from the previous stage k, which can be
used to obtain desired bits from DBn, is
(
K−1
k−1
)
(t− 1)k−1 k− 1-tuples, which also gives the number
of desired bits that can be obtained. By symmetrizing the stage, we obtain a total number of(
K
k
)
(t− 1)k−1 k-tuples, out of which only (K−1k−1 )(t− 1)k−1 desired bits are obtained.
The following two lemmas proves that the achievable scheme is correct and private, and com-
pletes the proof of achievability of the capacity expression in Theorem 2.
Lemma 6 The achievable scheme is correct and achieves the trade-off stated in Theorem 2.
Proof: The correctness of the scheme follows from a counting argument. Let us calculate the total
number of desired bits and the total number of downloaded bits. For each database, there are(
N−1
t−1
)
blocks. For each block, there are K ordered stages, where in Stage k, a total number of(
K
k
)
(t− 1)k−1 coded k-tuple bits are downloaded, out of which (K−1k−1 )(t− 1)k−1 are desired bits.
Desired bits (per DB)
=
(
N − 1
t− 1
) K∑
k=1
(
K − 1
k − 1
)
(t− 1)k−1 =
(
N − 1
t− 1
)K−1∑
k′=0
(
K − 1
k′
)
(t− 1)k′
=
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
(1 + (t− 1))K−1 =
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
tK−1 =
1
N
×
(
N
t
)
tK .
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Total downloaded bits (per DB) (90)
=
(
N − 1
t− 1
) K∑
k=1
(
K
k
)
(t− 1)k−1 =
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
1
t− 1
K−1∑
k=1
(
K
k
)
(t− 1)k
=
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
1
t− 1(t
K − 1) =
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
(tK−1 + tK−2 + · · ·+ t+ 1). (91)
From all the N databases, the user is able to recover L =
(
N
t
)
tK coded bits of the desired
message. Furthermore, since all these desired bits are distinct and only paired with side information
previously downloaded, the user can decode all the L bits of the desired message and hence the
scheme is proven correct. The download cost D(µ) of the proposed storage constrained PIR scheme
when µ = t/N and t ∈ [1 : N ] is given as
D(µ) =
N × Total Downloaded bits (per DB)
N ×Desired bits (per DB)
=
(
N−1
t−1
)
(tK−1 + tK−2 + · · ·+ t+ 1)(
N−1
t−1
)
tK−1
= 1 +
1
t
+
1
t2
+ · · ·+ 1
tK−1
= D˜(t). (92)
Using the memory sharing concept in Claim 1, we can achieve the lower convex envelope of the
following N achievable points:(
µ =
t
N
, D(µ) = D˜(t) = 1 +
1
t
+
1
t2
+ · · ·+ 1
tK−1
)
, ∀t ∈ [1 : N ], (93)
which matches the trade-off given in Theorem 2. 
Lemma 7 The achievable scheme is private.
Proof: The privacy of the scheme is guaranteed using three factors:
1. The query structure to each database is symmetric with respect to all the K messages.
2. All the bits downloaded from a database are distinct for all messages, i.e., no bit is downloaded
more than once.
3. The user randomly permutes the bits indexes of each message before designing the queries.
These three steps make the query to any database independent from the index of the desired
message Wi, i.e., I(i;Q
[i]
n ) = 0 for all n ∈ [1 : N ].
To prove this formally, we calculate the probability of an arbitrary query realization. In each
Block S, the user downloads a number of tK−1 bits of the desired sub-message Wi,S from each
database DBn, where n ∈ S. Due to the symmetric query structure, the number of bits of every
undesired sub-message, Wj,S where j ∈ [1 : K] \ i, involved in the block per database is tK−1
bits as well. According to the permutation δj,S , the user permutes the bits indexes of each sub-
message Wj,S , and therefore, the tK−1 bits involved in the query block S for DBn are given as:
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(w
(`i,j,n,S1 )
j,S , w
(`i,j,n,S2 )
j,S , . . . , w
(`i,j,n,S
tK−1 )
j,S ), where (`
i,j,n,S
1 , . . . , `
i,j,n,S
tK−1 ) ⊂ δj,S and can be found according to
the order of the databases to which the user sends the queries as well as the desired message index
i. Without loss of generality, an arbitrary realization of (w
(`i,j,n,S1 )
j,S , w
(`i,j,n,S2 )
j,S , . . . , w
(`i,j,n,S
tK−1 )
j,S ) can be
considered to be (w1j,S , w
2
j,S , . . . , w
tK−1
j,S ). The probability of such realization of the query block S
at DBn is then given as:
Pr
[
∪Kj=1
(
(w
(`i,j,n,S1 )
j,S , w
(`i,j,n,S2 )
j,S , . . . , w
(`i,j,n,S
tK−1 )
j,S ) = (w
1
j,S , w
2
j,S , . . . , w
tK−1
j,S )
)]
=
K∏
j=1
Pr
[
(w
(`i,j,n,S1 )
j,S , w
(`i,j,n,S2 )
j,S , . . . , w
(`i,j,n,S
tK−1 )
j,S ) = (w
1
j,S , w
2
j,S , . . . , w
tK−1
j,S )
]
=
K∏
j=1
Pr
[
`i,j,n,S1 = 1, `
i,j,n,S
2 = 2, . . . , `
i,j,n,S
tK−1 = t
K−1
]
=
((
1
tK
)(
1
tK − 1
)
× · · · ×
(
1
tK − tK−1 + 1
))K
, (94)
which is independent of the desired message index i, i.e., I(i;Q
[i]
n ) = 0.
Next, we show that the privacy condition in (7) is satisfied through the following:
I(i;Q[i]n , A
[i]
n ,W[1:K],Z[1:N ]) = I(i;Q
[i]
n )+I(i;W[1:K],Z[1:N ]|Q[i]n )+I(i;A[i]n |W[1:K],Z[1:N ], Q[i]n ) = 0,
(95)
where the second term, I(i;W[1:K],Z[1:N ]|Q[i]n ) is zero since the user does not know the messages or
the actual contents of the databases when he chooses the index i and designs the query Q
[i]
n , while
the third term, I(i;A
[i]
n |W[1:K],Z[1:N ], Q[i]n ) is zero since the answer A[i]n is fully determined by DBn
knowing the query Q
[i]
n and the part of the storage content Zn. 
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we characterized the optimal download cost of PIR for uncoded storage constrained
databases. In particular, for any (N,K), we show that the optimal trade-off between the storage
parameter, µ ∈ [1, N ], and the download cost, D(µ), is given by the lower convex hull of the pairs
( tN ,
(
1 + 1t +
1
t2
+ · · ·+ 1
tK−1
)
) for t ∈ [1 : N ]. The main technical contribution of this paper is
obtaining lower bounds on the download cost for PIR as a function of storage, which matches the
achievable scheme in [27], and hence characterizes the optimal trade-off. We first arrived to a lower
bound on the download cost, which is valid for both coded and uncoded placement strategies. We
then specialized the obtained bound for uncoded placement strategies, which helps in obtaining a
linear program subject to message size and storage constraints. Solving this linear program, we
arrive at a set of N−1 lower bounds, where each bound is tight in a certain range of storage. There
are several interesting future directions on this important variation of storage-constrained PIR such
as a) settling the tradeoff with coded storage allowed at databases, b) colluding databases and c)
40
introducing additional reliability constraints on storage, such that data must be recoverable from
any N out of M databases.
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